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INTRODUCTION
Taiwan may be one of the most unique entities under international
law. The international community acknowledges its existence, but is re-
luctant to recognize its statehood. Despite its status as a "non-recognized
State," or an "entity sui generis,"' most countries engage in bilateral
trade and establish "non-official" relations with Taiwan. These relations
* Associate, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington DC; Editor, Chinese (Taiwan)
Yearbook of International Law and Affairs; J.D., LL.M., University of Pennsylvania. I would
like to thank Professor Jacques deLisle, Professor William Burke-White, Adam Perlin, Omar
Serrano, and Melisma Cox for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I
would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Christine Chang.
1. This concept may refer to "entities which maintain some sort of existence on the
international plane in spite of their anomalous character" and "this is the situation of Taiwan
(Formosa)." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-65 (6th ed.
2003); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (4th ed. 1997) ("Taiwan would appear
to be a non-state territorial entity which is de jure part of China but under separate administra-
tion.").
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are due to Taiwan's trade power as the world's 17th largest economy
and the third largest holder of foreign exchange reserves.' During the last
decade, Taiwan has transformed from an authoritarian regime into a full-
fledged democracy. Hence, western countries regard Taiwan as a model
of democracy for China and other developing countries, particularly
those in East Asia.4
Lack of diplomatic recognition, however, has jeopardized Taiwan's
status in both foreign countries and international settings. As of now,
only twenty-four countries, none of them world powers, give Taiwan full
recognition.! Facing diplomatic isolation, Taiwan can rarely use its offi-
cial name, Republic of China (ROC), abroad. The Taiwanese cannot
display their national flag or sing their national anthem in international
settings.6 The nation exists as one entity with multiple identities. For in-
stance, Taiwan's embassies may be called "Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office," "Taipei Representative Office," or "Chung Hwa Travel
2. Republic of China, Government Information Office, A Brief Introduction to Tai-
wan: The Economy, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/brief/info04_8.html (last
visited Nov. 26, 2007).
3. Id. Taiwan has a trade balance of US $15,818 million and a per capita GNP of US
$15,676. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report
by Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 2-3, WT/TPR/G/165,
(May 16, 2006); U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Taiwan, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (Oct. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm.
4. Taiwan's first direct presidential election was held in 1996. In 2000, the opposition
party leader won the presidential election, ending more than 50 years of one-party rule. Re-
public of China, Government Information Office, Direct Presidential Election in Taiwan
(ROC), http://www.gio.gov.tw/elect2004/news/twO4_O5.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). See
also Background Note: Taiwan, supra note 3 ("In March 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian
became the first opposition party candidate to win the presidency. His victory resulted in the
first-ever transition of the presidential office from one political party to another, validating
Taiwan's democratic political system.")
5. Twenty-four countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan (ROC) in-
clude: Europe (Holy See); East Asia and Pacific (Kirbati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau,
Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu); Central and South America (Belize, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Christopher & Ne-
vis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & Grenadines); and Africa (Burkina Faso, The Gambia,
Malawi, Sao Tome & Principe, and Swaziland). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of
China (Taiwan), Embassies and Missions Abroad, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/
lp.asp?ctNode= 1019&CtUnit=30&BaseDSD=30&mp=6 (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
6. E.g., HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 220 (1989)(stating that Taiwan "agreed to abandon, as required,
the ROC flag and national anthem when participating in future Olympic Games"); Max
Woodworth, It's All Fun and Games until China Gets Hurt, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at
A 1l, available at http://www.taipeitimes.comNews/feat/archives/200 1/12/20/116620 ("Tseng
won first place at the World Cyber Games (WCG) in Seoul[.] ... [He] rose from his seat and
declared at the top of his voice 'Taiwan No. !' and waved a national flag. It is a violation of
the games' rules to display Taiwan's national flag.").
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Service; '7 and its memberships in international organizations are often
labeled "Chinese Taipei," "Taipei, China," or "China (Taiwan)."8
Taiwan's diplomatic problems result from pressure from The Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC), and its insistence on the "one China"
principle. The PRC asserts that, "there is but one China" and "Taiwan is
an inalienable part of China."9 China opposes any of Taiwan's efforts to
"split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."' The PRC's asser-
tions gained force in a 1971 Resolution of the United Nations that
transferred the China seat to the government in Beijing," subsequent to
which most foreign nations, including the United States, terminated their
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Since then, foreign countries and in-
ternational organizations have frequently encountered the dilemma of
how to grant Taiwan proper diplomatic treatment without offending
China.
This Article provides a comparative analysis of the status of the Re-
public of China on Taiwan in foreign and international settings. Most
existing literature written from the traditional public international law
perspective focuses on Taiwan's separate statehood from China.' 2 This
7. Republic of China's Official, Semi-Official or Unofficial Missions Abroad, 20 CHI-
NESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 504, 504-20 (2002).
8. For instance, "Chinese Taipei" is used by the WTO and for purposes of the Olympic
Games; the Asian Development Bank refers to Taiwan as "Taipei China;" and "China (Tai-
wan)" is used by the International Cotton Advisory Committee. Most United Nations agencies
use the term "Taiwan, Province of China." See also Jacques deLisle, The Chinese Puzzle of
Taiwan's Status, 24 ORBIs 35, 37 (2000) (describing how Taiwan uses "the alphabet soup of
labels").
9. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, The Taiwan Question and Reunification
of China (Sept. 9, 1993), http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp (follow "The Taiwan Ques-
tion and Reunification of China (1993-9-1)" hyperlink under "White Papers On Taiwan
Issue") [hereinafter 1993 White Papers]; Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (Feb. 21, 2000), http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/
index.asp (follow "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000-2-21)" hyperlink
under "White Papers On Taiwan Issue") [hereinafter 2000 White Papers](arguing that the two
Germanys formula should not apply to China-Taiwan relations).
10. 1993 White Papers, supra note 9. See also 2000 White Papers, supra note 9 (stating
that China may use force "against the scheme to create an 'independent Taiwan' and against
the foreign forces interfering with the reunification of China .... ").
11. G.A. Res. 2758, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8439
(Oct. 25, 1971), reprinted in II I.L.M. 561 (1972). See TIEN, supra note 6, at 219 ("In October
1971, in yet another U.N. vote on the China seat, the United States dropped its lobbing on the
ROC's behalf and the China seat went to [Beijing]. The ROC had been ousted from the United
Nations.").
12. See e.g., Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan's Current International Legal Status, 32 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 675, 676 (1998) ("Taiwan is an island nation, separate from continental China.
Taiwan is Taiwan and China is China."); Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan's Case for
United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393, 423 (1996-97) ("Tai-
wan has fulfilled the prerequisites for statehood, adhering to the rights and duties associated
with states under international law."); Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 87 (2004) ("China has no sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and its
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Article addresses an important pragmatic issue that international courts
and courts in foreign countries frequently face: whether Taiwan is a
"foreign State" for particular salutatory purposes in judicial proceedings.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of China-Taiwan relations and
the status of Taiwan under international law. I argue that the ROC on
Taiwan has been a sovereign State since its creation in 1912 and was
never "succeeded" by the PRC, which was established in 1949. By my
analysis, both the ROC and the PRC are equal entities in the "divided
China"; neither side belongs to the other. Part II examines the decisions
of domestic courts that have addressed the status of Taiwan in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan. In these countries
(which do not recognize Taiwan as an autonomous entity, but nonethe-
less maintain substantial "non-official" ties with it), domestic courts
have employed various devices to ensure the State-like status of Taiwan,
thus safeguarding the country's interests and allowing continued eco-
nomic and diplomatic relations with the ROC. Consequently, judicial
recognition of Taiwan's existence as a State has risen to the level of cus-
tomary international law. Part III explores the possibility of Taiwan
bringing suit as a "State" before the International Court of Justice, as a
"fishing entity" before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
and as a "separate customs territory" in the dispute resolution mecha-
nism of the World Trade Organization. This Article concludes that to
avoid creating a global judicial "black hole," it is both necessary and
pragmatic to officially deem Taiwan a State in judicial proceedings of
any kind.
I. TAIWAN'S STATUS AND ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA
A. Historical Background
Taiwan fell to China in 1684 during the Ching Dynasty and was
formally made a province of the Chinese Empire in 1885.13 After Japan
defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war, the Ching Dynasty signed the
people. The one-China principle that the P.R.C. government advocates is flawed in its proposi-
tion that Taiwan is part of China."). For the view of the PRC, see generally Che-Fu Lee,
China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 695 (1998) and Zhengyuan Fu,
China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue, I UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 321 (1996-97).
13. See Taiwan Yearbook 2007, History (2007), http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-
website/5-gp/yearbook/03history.html#04. See generally GARY KLINTWORTH, NEW TAIWAN,
NEW CHINA: TAIWAN'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 5 (1995)("Taiwan was
not associated with traditional Chinese territory in any formal way until the Ch'ing Dynasty
and the [PRC's] claim that Taiwan was part of 'the sacred territory of China since ancient
times' is difficult to sustain.").
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Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, ceding Taiwan "in perpetuity" to Japan."
After the Second World War, the Japanese retreated from Taiwan under
the terms of the Cairo Declaration, issued in 1943, which mandated that
Taiwan "be returned to the Republic of China."" The Republic of China,
to which the Allied Powers referred, was the government of the Chinese
Nationalist Party, which had overthrown the Ching Dynasty in 1912. Af-
ter the Chinese civil war between the Nationalist Party and the
Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the estab-
lishment of the PRC in 1949. The defeated ROC government, led by the
Nationalist Party, retreated to Taiwan. Since then, China has had two
regimes, the PRC on Mainland China and the ROC on Taiwan. The PRC
planned to "liberate" Taiwan while the ROC intended to "counterattack
and recover" the mainland. Both sides claimed to be the only legitimate
government representing China and thus commenced a zero-sum race in
diplomatic battles. 6
For two decades, the ROC on Taiwan continued to represent the "old
China." It enjoyed diplomatic recognition by most States and had mem-
bership in the United Nations, of which the ROC was a founding State.
In the 1970s, the world abruptly moved away from recognizing Taiwan
as a separate State. In 1971, with allied developing countries siding with
the PRC, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, expelling
the ROC and giving China's seat to the PRC. 7 In less than one year,
Taiwan was ousted from most UN-affiliated organizations. Even worse
for Taiwan's cause, in 1979 the United States, Taiwan's long-term ally,
decided to recognize the PRC as the representative government of China
and terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan.
14. Treaty of Shimonoseki, China-Japan, art. 2, May 8, 1895, 181 Consol. T.S.
217("China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together
with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon: ... (b) The island of Formosa,
together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa... ).
15. The Cairo Declaration was issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek of the Re-
public of China, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States. The Declarations stated that "all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be
returned to the Republic of China." Cairo Conference, 9 Dep't. St. Bull. 393 (Dec. 1, 1943).
16. See CHO HuI-WAN, TAIWAN'S APPLICATION TO GATT/WTO: SIGNIFICANCE OF
MULTILATERALISM FOR AN UNRECOGNIZED STATE 112 (2001) (discussing that the ROC and
the PRC "have been in diplomatic war with each other to win recognition by foreign states as
'the sole legal government of China. Both say there is only one China, but until 1992 each
claimed to be 'the one' representing China"); Che-Fu, supra note 12, at 326 ("Despite all the
deep animosity between the CCP and the KMT, both sides believed that there is only one
China, and Taiwan is a part of China.").
17. See CHO, supra note 16, at 116-18 (discussing the ROC's withdrawal from the
United Nations).
Summer 20071
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B. The Statehood of Taiwan under International Law
After the 1970's, due to lack of membership in most State-oriented
UN organs and the derecognition by major world powers, Taiwan's in-
ternational status became a complex puzzle. Most countries find it
thorny to deal with the unique relationship between China and Taiwan.
To understand the issue of Taiwan's statehood, it is important to discuss
cross-strait relations. In my view, the PRC-ROC relationship can be de-
picted as two equal entities in one divided China. On the one hand,
Taiwan did not declare independence from "old China," to which both
Mainland China and Taiwan once belonged. An independent "Republic
of Taiwan" never came into existence. The state of the ROC remains the
same. The only change after 1949 was the land and the population it
controls. On the other hand, the PRC, since its creation, has never exer-
cised jurisdiction over Taiwan and its outer islands." Hence, the PRC
and the ROC are separate but equal, and neither belongs to the other.
The concept of divided States can be illustrated by the Korean and
German examples. The fact that the constitutions of both Koreas uphold
the principle of "one Korea" does not prevent the two Koreas from pos-
sessing separate international personalities.' 9 The German example went
even further. In December 1972, the two Germanys concluded a treaty to
normalize their relations.20 The Constitutional Court of the Federal Re-
public of Germany affirmed the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty,
ruling that relations between the "two parts of Germany with separate
statehood" should be "governed by international law."2' Both Germanys
were, and both Koreas are, widely recognized by most foreign countries
22and were entitled to UN membership. However, the PRC disputes the
18. See Lee Teng-hui, Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 9 ("In the 50 years since the P.R.C. was founded, both sides of the
Taiwan Strait have been separately ruled, with neither subordinate to the other. This situation
has not changed in any substantive way since 1949").
19. CONST. OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF 1998 art. 9 ("the DPRK
shall strive [to] ... reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunifica-
tion and great national unity."); CONST. OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA art. 4 ("The Republic of
Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification
based on the principles of freedom and democracy.").
20. See Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Na-
tions-With Special Reference to the Chinese (Mainland-Taiwan) Case, 1 CHINESE (TAIWAN)
YB OF INTL L. AND AFF. 1 4-5 (1981); see also Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not Be
Trampled Because The Tigers Need Not Fight- New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Dj-
tente Across the Taiwan Strait, 34 VAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 524-25 (200 1)(stating that the
German experience may be applied to China-Taiwan relations).
21. Chiu, supra note 20, at 5.
22. For further discussions on the concept of divided states and the German and Korean
examples, see DIVIDED STATES, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1085-89
(1992); see also Yung Wei, Recognition of Divided States: Implications and Application of
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two-Koreas and two-Germanys formulas, and contends that the division
of these two countries occurred because of arrangements by foreign su-
perpowers. The PRC argues that this "external factor" makes the
situation between Taiwan and China inherently different from the Ger-
man example. 3
The PRC's argument is flawed because under international law the
reason for a country's formation has no impact on the determination of
its statehood. In other words, neither an "external factor," such as foreign
intervention, nor an "internal factor," such as civil war, has any bearing
on the ROC's status as a State. Instead, the factors that determine the
ROC's statehood must be limited to those given in Article I of the Mon-
24tevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States . Article I stipulates
that a State should possess four characteristics, including 1) a permanent
population; 2) a defined territory; 3) a government; and 4) capacity to
enter into relations with other States. The ROC on Taiwan meets all four
21requirements .
First, the ROC has a permanent population that currently numbers
23 million living on Taiwan and its outlying islands.26 Second, the ROC
has a territory of "existing national boundaries." Some argue that the
ROC's territory is yet to be defined because of disputes with China over
territory.27 Nonetheless, international law does not require fully defined
territory. Both Russia and Japan have disputed territories with China, yet
their statehoods have never been challenged. Third, the ROC is an
Concepts of "Multi-System Nations," "Political Entities," and "Intra-Commonwealth," 34
INT'L L. 997 (2000).
23. See 2000 White Papers, supra note 9 (arguing that the two Germanys formula
should not apply to China-Taiwan relations).
24. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 17. See also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Mon-
tevideo Convention and Its Discounts, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 408 (1999) (stating
that the convention is the "source most often cited as authority on the definition of the state.").
25. For discussions regarding Taiwan's statehood under Article I of the Montevideo
Convention, see Chang & Lim, supra note 12, at 420-23; Tzu-Wen Lee, The International
Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, I UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 351,
387-88 (1996-1997); Christopher J. Carolan, Note, The "Republic of Taiwan": A Legal-
Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 75 N.YU. L. REv. 429,
451-56 (2000).
26. Taiwan: History, Geography, Government, and Culture-Infoplease.com, http://
www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108020.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
27. See BROWNLIE, supra note I, at 71 ("[T]he existence of fully defined frontiers is
not required and . . . what matters is the effective establishment of a political community.").
SHAW, supra note 1, at 139 ("[T]here is no necessity in international law for defined and set-
tled boundaries, . . . so long as there is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably
controlled by the government of the alleged state.").
28. See Gregory Clark, Northern Territories Dispute Highlights Flawed
Diplomacy, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 24, 2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
eo20050324gc.html.
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autonomous government independent of the PRC. The people of Taiwan
democratically elect leaders of both the central and local governments."
Finally, the ROC has the capacity to conduct foreign relations. It main-
tains representative offices in almost 100 countries, 3° and it has
concluded treaties and agreements even with countries with which Tai-
wan has no formal relations.3' Moreover, the ROC possesses full
membership in numerous international organizations, including the
World Trade Organization and the Asian Development Bank.32 Some
contend that the ROC is unable to establish diplomatic relations with
most countries, hence undermining its capacity to conduct foreign rela-
tions. However, Taiwan's main obstacle to maintaining foreign relations
is China's pressure on foreign States, not Taiwan's incapacity to conduct
foreign relations. Using this explanation, it is not difficult to distinguish
Taiwan from other State-like entities that lack diplomatic relations with
other countries. For instance, although Chechnya and Northern Cyprus
may satisfy the first three criteria under Article I of the Montevideo
Convention, they lack the capacity to enter into relations with foreign
States and international organizations."
Taiwan's lack of diplomatic recognition does not affect its status as a
State. There are two main theories of diplomatic recognition in interna-
tional law.3 According to the constitutive theory, recognition constitutes
an essential element of statehood. This approach is difficult to adopt in
practice because "states cannot by their independent judgment establish
any competence of other states."35 The prevailing view of recognition is
the declaratory theory, which asserts that recognition is only the formal
29. See Jonathan Manthorpe, Opposition wins Taiwan election, NAT'L POST, Mar. 22,
2008, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=393804 (last visited May 7, 2008);
Bowing Out: Electoral humiliation marks the end of the Chen Shui-bian era, ECONOMIST, Jan.
19, 2008, available at http://www.economist.con/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story-id=
10533931.
30. See generally, Taiwan, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dep't. of State,
supra note 3. For the complete list of Taiwan's representative offices abroad, see Taiwan, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?CtNode=
279&CtUnit=30&BaseDSD=30&mp=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
31. See, e.g., Taiwan, Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, http://www.dot.gov.tw/
en/display/tax-treaty-policy.asp. (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
32. Taiwan currently has memberships in twenty-two international organizations. See
Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/
lp.asp?ctNode=1037&CtUnit=46&BaseDSD=39&mp=6 (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
33. Chechnya and Northern Cyprus are not members of any international organization.
Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. See generally Anthony Comfort, Policy De-
partment Note on Turkey and the Problem of the Recognition of Cyprus, available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/553/553930/553930en.pdf.
34. See I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 117-21 (11th ed. 1994) for
discussions on recognition. See also Lee, supra note 12, at 386 ("[T]he international status of
a state is established 'independently of recognition.' ").
35. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 88.
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acknowledgement of statehood or government.36 In the Tinoco Conces-
sions Arbitration, a case between the United Kingdom and Costa Rica,
the arbitrator pointed out that, on the basis of international law, "non-
recognition for any reason, however, cannot outweigh the evidence dis-
closed by this record before me as to the de facto character of Tinoco's
government."" A US Court of Appeals in Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic also held that "whether or not a government
exists ... is a fact, not a theory.!38 Consequently, the ROC's status as a
State is not undermined by a lack of recognition.
In practice, despite the lack of formal relations, courts in foreign
States explicitly and implicitly recognize that Taiwan meets the "State"
requirements for particular legal purposes, and hold that Taiwan is not
part of the PRC, but of the ROC.3 9 By recognizing the statehood of both
the PRC and the ROC, their relations should be governed by interna-
tional law and, as a consequence, both sides would be obliged to settle
their disputes peacefully.40 The International Court of Justice would re-
solve political conflicts, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
would determine maritime disputes, and the dispute resolution mecha-
nism of the World Trade Organization would resolve trade issues.
II. FOREIGN COURT DECISIONS REGARDING
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TAIWAN
A. Practice of Foreign Courts
After the 1970s, most major States switched recognition from the
ROC to the PRC. This political decision has created complex legal issues
for domestic courts. The question of how to treat Taiwan, an ally for-
mally recognized as the ROC, became a high-profile judicial puzzle that
triggered a series of sensitive diplomatic maneuvers. Below is an explo-
ration of judicial decisions in countries with which Taiwan maintains
36. Id. at 87-88. The status of a state does not depend on whether it receives diplomatic
recognition from other states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 202 cmts. a, b (1987).
37. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 88.
38. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 138 N.E. 24,24 (N.Y.
1923); see also Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 213 N.Y.S.2d. 417, 419 (1961)
("A foreign government, although not recognized by the political arm of the United States
Government, may nevertheless have defacto existence which is juridically cognizable.").
39. See SHEARER, supra note 34, at 123 (discussing examples of "legitimate occasions
for conclusively implying recognition").
40. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered.").
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substantial "unofficial" relations and their treatment of the question of
Taiwan's status as an independent State.
1. United States
The ROC has been an old ally of the United States. The two coun-
tries concluded the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955 in the aftermath of
the Chinese Civil War and Korean War.4' However, in the 1970s, the
United States began normalizing relations with the PRC as a result of
Sino-Soviet conflicts.42 In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China
and the U.S. and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communique, in which
the United States "acknowledge [d]" that "there is but one China" and
"Taiwan is a part of China. '43 On January 1, 1979, President Jimmy
Carter formally announced the decision to terminate relations with the
ROC and to recognize the PRC as "the sole legal government of
China."' Several days later, Taiwan was notified by the United States
that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated on January 1,
1980.45
President Carter's decision was a shock to Taiwan, and infuriated the
U.S. Congress, where most members felt that the United States' aban-
donment of its long-time ally would severely affect its credibility with
46 oother countries. Members of Congress attempted to salvage U.S.-
41. The Treaty was signed by representatives of both nations on December 2, 1954 and
was approved by the Senate and signed by the President on February 11, 1955. Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F. 2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See generally Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-
China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 434. In particular, Article V of the Treaty provides that each
nation "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process."
42. See John R. Bolton, About "Dual Recognition," http://www.fapa.org/dualrecognition/
aboutdualrecog207.html ("Nixon believed that 'playing the China card' would gain for the
United States and unusual and highly unexpected ally in the global struggle against the Soviet
Union and its satellites.").
43. See TIEN, supra note 6, at 233; Before Nixon's visit, he sent Henry Kissinger, U.S.
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Beijing to negotiate the meeting of
leaders of the two countries. For Nixon's policy on China-Taiwan relations, see Chiang, supra
note 12, at 49-53.
44. The Normalization Communiqud and Associated Documents in RICHARD C. BUSH,
AT CROSS PURPOSES: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS SINCE 1942 138 (2004). On December 30,
1978, President Carter signed a memorandum "recognizing the government of the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and ... terminating diplomatic rela-
tions with the Republic of China." President's Memorandum for All Departments and
Agencies: Relations with the People of Taiwan, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 36, 75 [here-
inafter "President's Memorandum"]. The President's Memorandum also acknowledged that
the United States wished to maintain relations "with the people of Taiwan without official
government representation and without diplomatic relations." Id.
45. Goldwater, 617 F. 2d at 700.
46. At a debate during the first U.S. Congress on March 12, 1979, Sen. David Boren
stated that "[t]he government on Taiwan, the Republic of China, has never done anything to
deserve mistreatment by the Government of the United States. They have been our friend." 14
CHINESE (TAIWAN) YB INT'L L. & AFF. 128 (1995-96).
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Taiwan relations by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which
became the first and only U.S. legislation designed for an unrecognized
State. 47 The TRA outlines the relationship between the United States and
Taiwan. Its purpose is to ensure non-official relations between the peo-S48
ple, instead of the governments, of the two countries. In particular, the
TRA stipulates that "[tihe absence of diplomatic relations or recognition
shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with re-
spect to Taiwan. 49
The TRA is the only comprehensive domestic statute in the world
governing relations with Taiwan.0 Due to substantial relations between
Taiwan and the United States, the courts' judicial interpretations of
Taiwan's status and the TRA provide abundant guidance, to which many
47. Members of Congress also challenged the President's unilateral termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty. In Goldwater v. Carter, they argued that the President's decision con-
travened Congress' "advice and consent" power under the U.S. Constitution. In their view,
since two-thirds of the Senate vote is required to ratify a treaty, the same process should be
followed to abrogate a treaty. Yet, the efforts of Congress failed. In 1979, the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated the Circuit Court's decision, which had sided with Congress, and held that the
current case was not yet ripe for judicial review due to the lack of a constitutional impasse.
Four concurring Justices held the view that this was a political question, which the Court
should not review. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See U.S. CONST.,
art. II, § 2 ("The President ... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."); see also Colin
P.A. Jones, United States Arms Exports to Taiwan Under The Taiwan Relations Act: The
Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 51, 56 (1993)
(detailing the case of Goldwater v. Carter). It is noteworthy that Article V of the U.S.-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty stipulates that it would remain in force "indefinitely," but states that
"[e]ither Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party." How-
ever, the Treaty does not contain specific provisions regarding the process of terminating the
Treaty.
48. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-16 (2000) ("[The Act] authorize[s] the continuation of commer-
cial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on
Taiwan.").
49. 22 U.S.C. § 3303 (2000).
50. For instance, the Taiwan Relations Act provides that U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations
depend on "the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."
22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2000). In addition, "to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peace-
ful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] ... of grave concern to the United States."
Id. See Jones, supra note 47, at 60-62 (describing US. arms sales to Taiwan); Steven M. Gold-
stein & Randall Schriver, An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the
Taiwan Relations Act, 165 CHINA Q. 147, 149-51 (2001) (explaining some controversial
terms in the TRA). There are two significant points concerning the TRA and U.S. courts'
interpretations of that statute. First, the TRA is not construed as a "treaty," but as U.S. domes-
tic law. Hence, it is erroneous to state, as some Taiwanese politicians have claimed, that the
U.S. bears an "international obligation" to protect Taiwan. Legally speaking, unlike the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty, Taiwan is unable to invoke the TRA to ask the U.S. to defend Taiwan,
should it be attacked by China. Secondly, the TRA is unique in that Congress intended to treat
Taiwan as if it were a state without "recognizing" it as a state, a view that has been consis-
tently upheld by the judicial branch. Congress' enactment of the TRA has been widely
considered to be successful in guaranteeing Taiwan's interests and promoting substantive
relations between the two nations.
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other foreign courts refer. Judicial disputes involving Taiwan, or the
ROC, occurred in the pre-TRA era. During that period, U.S. courts either
recognized the ROC on Taiwan as the "de jure government of China,"'"
or deemed "Formosa," the ancient name of Taiwan, to be a nation for the
purposes of a particular statute 2 Hence, the State status of Taiwan in
U.S. courts was not substantially in doubt.
Nonetheless, problems arose following the termination of diplomatic
relations. Taiwan's greatest concern was the transfer of the ROC's prop-
erty to the PRC. Under international law, such transfer is the automatic
result of "State succession."" Taiwan was aware of this consequence. To
avoid this result, Taiwan sold its embassy property, known as "Twin
Oaks," which the ROC had acquired in 1947, to the Friends of Free
China, a private organization chaired by pro-Taiwan Congressmen.5 This
"sale" was for the nominal sum of U.S. $10 and was executed on De-
cember 22, 1978, seven days before President Carter announced the
termination of formal relations with the ROC on Taiwan.56
The PRC asked the U.S. government to block the transfer of the em-
bassy property to Friends of Free China, contending that all government
properties of China belonged to the PRC.57 Ultimately, the TRA pre-
vented the invalidation of this transfer by declaring that the absence of
recognition of the ROC does not affect property interests "heretofore or
51. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rep. of China, 254 F.2d 177, 187 (4th Cir. 1958).
("[T]he vessels were sold to the 'Government of the Republic of China' and not to the Chinese
state ... and further, that the Nationalist government, in the US law, was still the de jure gov-
ernment of China....").
52. See Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng, 280 F.2d 663, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (holding
that Formosa is a "country" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
53. See Aspects of the Law of State Succession, International Law Association (2004),
at 3 ("In all the types of State succession the transfer of an immobile property to the successor
was confirmed. Specific regulations concern a destiny of mobile property in particular types of
succession.").
54. For an introduction to Twin Oaks, see The Republic of China's (Taiwan) Twin Oaks
Estate, http://www.taiwanembassy.org/us/content.asp?Cultem=l 1441 (last visited Mar. 23,
2008).
55. Property of "De-recognized" Government, 14 CHINESE (TAIWAN) YB INT'L L. &
AFF. 105 (1995-96).
56. How Twin Oaks Came to be Sold for a Mere $10, Taipei Update, Apr. 16, 2001, at
8, available at http://dc.roc-taiwan.org/tpupdate/html/noO14/css/noO14_8.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008).
57. See Property of "De-recognized" Government 14 CHINESE (TAIWAN) YB INT'L L.
& Are. 105-06 (1995-96) (citing Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher's testimony
that "[w]ith respect to diplomatic property that was acquired before 1949 .... that diplomatic
property belongs to the People's Republic of China...."). The US Department of State sup-




hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan." ' Because of this provi-
sion, the case of the RPC's diplomatic real property never went to court.
Nonetheless, U.S. courts encountered more complex issues regard-
ing the ROC's bank deposits in the United States. The first case
addressing this problem was the Wells Fargo Bank case. 9 In 1949, due to
the civil war in China, the Bank of China's headquarters moved to
Taipei. The Liberation Army took over the old office in Shanghai and
claimed "to have succeeded to the ownership" of the bank, thus dividing
it.6° In 1953, both Banks of China claimed to be entitled to funds depos-
ited in a Wells Fargo Bank branch in California. To decide which bank
was the real depositor, the court followed the executive branch's view
that the ROC on Taiwan was the recognized government and ruled that
the Bank of China in Taipei was entitled to the fund.6'
Following the derecognition of the ROC, another American court
encountered a similar question.62 After 1949, the Bank of China in Taipei
was reorganized and was renamed the International Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC). The New York branch maintained allegiance with Taipei,
but the two branches in Pakistan sided with Beijing. The two Pakistan
branches maintained deposits in the New York bank.63 Subsequently, the
PRC transferred control of the two branches to Pakistan. The National
Bank of Pakistan brought suit against the ICBC and claimed the assets in
the New York account. The ICBC urged the court to consider the prece-
dent set by the Wells Fargo Bank case, meaning that the Bank of
Pakistan should be collaterally estopped from claiming rights to the de-
posit. The court rejected this argument, holding that because the Wells
58. Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(3)(A) (2000). In 1982, the Friends of
China Association transferred Twin Oaks back to the ROC government. Later, the ROC gov-
ernment built a large new "non-embassy" on Wisconsin Avenue and uses Twin Oaks for
"unofficial entertaining." June Teufel Dreyer, TAIWAN SECURITY RESEARCH, China's Attitude
Toward the Taiwan Relations Act n. 41 (May 1999), available at http://taiwansecurity.org/
IS/IS-Dreyer.htm.
59. See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 ESupp. 59, 61-63
(N.D. Cal. 1952); see also Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d
467 (9th Cir. 1953).
60. Wells Fargo Bank, 104 F.Supp. at 62.
61. Nonetheless, the court conceded that "neither of the rival Banks of China is a true
embodiment of the corporate entity which made the deposit in the Wells Fargo Bank." Wells
Fargo Bank, 104 F.Supp. at 66. See also Wells Fargo Bank, 104 ESupp. at 62. (stating that it is
not proper for the court to determine "which government best represents the interests of the
Chinese State in the Bank of China" and thus the court "should justly accept ... that govern-
ment which our executive deems best able to further the mutual interest of China and the
United States."). The Court of Appeals also awarded interests to the Bank of China in Taipei.
See Wells Fargo Bank, 209 F.2d 467 at 477.
62. See Nat'l Bank of Pakistan v. Int'l Bank of Pakistan v. Int'l Commerce Bank of
China, 1999 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1988 at 11; Nat'l Bank of Pakistan v. Int'l Commerce Bank of
China, 543 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
63. Nat'l Bank of Pakistan, 1999 N.Y.L.J., at 11.
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Fargo Bank decision rested upon the formal recognition of the ROC, it
was inapplicable after the normalization of US-PRC relations.64 Further,
the court stated that the TRA "does not mandate a different conclu-
,,6Ssion.
Arguably, the National Bank of Pakistan decision is erroneous, as it
ignored the executive branch's intent that the ROC's bank deposits.. ,,66
should "continue unaffected by normalization. More importantly, the
court misinterpreted the TRA.67 In contrast to the court's finding that the
TRA is inapplicable, the TRA clearly stipulates that Taiwan's status un-
der US laws would not be affected by the absence of recognition.66
Legislative history further shows that that the legal rights under the TRA
contain those "involving bank assets."6 9 Consequently, the court's deci-
sion contravened the purpose of the TRA and violated the clear mandate
of the TRA by holding that Wells Fargo Bank was inapplicable.
Despite this one outlier, in nearly all subsequent cases, US courts
have consistently applied the TRA. These cases indicate that the "derec-
ognition of Taiwan did not change Taiwan's status as a nation."70 For
instance, in Dupont Circle Citizen's Association v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, the court held that Taiwan's de facto embassy met the defi-
nition of "chancery," the equivalent to a "foreign mission," within the
meaning of zoning regulations.7 ' Therefore, Taiwan's office should "be
64. Id.
65. See id. ("Because the [TRA] was promulgated after the United States declared it
would recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China, there is no basis to support
ICBC's contention that the act was intended to continue the pre-1978 status between the ROC
and the United States. ").
66. Letter from Herbet J. Hansell, Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State, to Sen. Frank
Church, Chairman of the Committee (Feb. 16, 1979) CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. & Aw.
106 (1995-96).
67. See Mitchell A. Silk & Lester Ross, Transnational Deposits, Government Succes-
sion, Frozen Assets and the Taiwan Relations Act: National Bank of Pakistan v. The
International Commercial Bank of China, 8 INT'L TAx & Bus. L. 1, 25 (1990) (arguing that
the decision was in violation of the TRA).
68. Under the TRA, US laws "shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the
laws of the United States applied ... Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979. Moreover, according to
the TRA, the derecognition of the ROC 'shall not abrogate, infringe, [or] modify' any rights
acquired by Taiwan before 1979." Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3303 (1979).
69. H.R.Rep. No. 96-26, pt. 1 at 9 (1985).
70. N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, 954 F.2d 847, 853 (2d Cir.
1992).
71. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 530 A.2d 1163,
1170 (D.C. 1987). A "chancery" is a principle office of "a foreign mission used for diplomatic
or used for diplomatic or related purposes..... Id. at 1166 (citing 11 DCMR § 199.9 (1986)).
Furthermore, a foreign mission is defined as "any mission to or agency or entity in the United
States which is involved in the diplomatic, consular, or other activities of, or which is substan-
tially owned or effectively by ... a foreign government..." 22 U.S.C.A. § 4302(a)(3) (West
2007 & Supp. 1987).
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treated as if derecognition has not occurred. '2 The court noted that the
language of the TRA states that lack of recognition "shall not" affect the
application of U.S. laws regarding Taiwan, and stressed that the word
"shall ... creates a duty, not an option.",7' Later, the court also ruled that
regulations of Taiwan are considered "foreign law" under U.S. law.1
4
Furthermore, the courts have consistently recognized that Taiwan's sov-
ereign acts fall under the "Act of State doctrine '"71 in U.S. law, and that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA)76 applies to Taiwan's State-77 7'
owned enterprises," government agencies, and officials 9 subject to lim-
ited exceptions under the FSIA.80
U.S. courts have consistently held that on the basis of the TRA, the
ROC-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN
Treaty, concluded in 1948) continue to be effective.8 ' They observed that
72. Dupont Circle Citizens, 530 A.2d at 1170.
73. Id. The Department of State agreed that Taiwan's office should be treated "as if it
were a chancery for purposes of' the zoning regulations. Id. at 1168.
74. United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 874 F2d 824, 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989).
The court held that Taiwanese regulations restricting the importation of salmon is "foreign
law" under the Lancey Act and, therefore, a violation that triggers the Act's civil forfeiture
provision. Id.
75. E.g., Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F2d
879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The doctrine applies with reference to Taiwan even though the
United States does not recognize that government."). Under the act of state doctrine, a nation
is sovereign within its territory and its domestic actions should not be questioned by foreign
courts. Regarding the application of the doctrine, courts usually defer to the executive branch.
See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
76. Under the FSIA, "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States," subject to some exceptions. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). In addition, that immunity extends to "a political subdivision of a for-
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that the Taiwan Steel Company is an instrumentality of Taiwan and is, there-
fore, entitled to immunity).
78. See, e.g., Chu v. Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly Bureau, 30 F.3d 139 (1994)
(finding that the Bureau is a government defendant and thus immune from jurisdiction).
79. See, e.g., Taiwan v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 712 (1997)
(deciding that the court is unable to compel Taiwanese diplomats to testify in U.S. courts).
Such immunity is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides Taiwanese diplomats
with immunities for "the effective performance" of their functions, 22 U.S.C. § 3309(c).
80. See Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F3d 1105, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Taiwan's
study tour for overseas Chinese is a "commercial activity" for purposes of the FSIA). How-
ever, in a subsequent appeal of the same case, the court affirmed that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception because there is no nexus
between the plaintiff's action and the commercial activity in the United States. Sun v. Taipei
Eco. & Cultural Representative Office, 34 F.App'x. 529, 531 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Liu v.
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the assassination of the
plaintiff operated by ROC officials constitutes the tortious activity exception under the FSIA).
81. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F Supp. 975, 977-78 (N.D. Il1. 1980)
(stating that under the FCN Treaty and the TRA, citizens of Taiwan are entitled to sue in federal
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the United States maintains "de facto recognition" of Taiwan and U.S.-
Taiwan relations are "quasi government relations. 82 This interpretation is
consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, which
stipulates that "[t]he severance of diplomatic or consular relations be-
tween parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established
between them by the treaty.
' 83
Regarding Taiwan's international treaties, the U.S. courts provide the
most informative legal analysis. Two district court decisions are particu-
larly problematic. These two decisions involve Taiwan and the Warsaw
Convention, an international treaty providing limited liability for an air
carrier and limiting the fora in which suits can be brought. 84 It should be
first noted that, although the ROC was involved in the drafting of the
Warsaw Convention in 1927, it never ratified it, and thus never became a
"High Contracting Party" to the Convention. Nonetheless, in 1958, the
PRC joined the Warsaw Convention with the declaration that the Con-
vention "shall of course apply to the entire Chinese territory including
Taiwan."85 Because the Warsaw Convention only applies to shipments
86between parties, controversies arise from whether Taiwan is bound by
the Convention, to which it is not a party. Recognizing Taiwan as a party
to the Convention would imply that Taiwan is under the PRC's jurisdic-
tion.
In Lee v. China Airlines, a district court dismissed the suit by the
plaintiffs-who suffered injuries as a result of a sudden drop during a
flight from Hong Kong via Taipei to San Francisco-due to the absence
of jurisdiction according to the Warsaw Convention.87 However, the court
indicated that the plaintiffs may bring suits in Hong Kong or Taiwan,
courts as citizens of recognized states); N.Y. Chinese T.V. Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc.,
954 F. Supp. 841, 847, 853-54 (D.N.J 1996) (finding that replacing the name "ROC" with
Taiwan in the FCN Treaty does not affect its validity). See generally Virginia K. DeMarchi,
Recent Development, United States-Taiwan Relations: New York Chinese TV Programs, Inv. v.
U.E. Enterprises, Inc., No. 91-764, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1992), 33 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 631
(1992).
82. Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 978 n.3.
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 63, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
84. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, art. 22, 28 Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. II [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention], for specific examples of how the Warsaw Convention limits liability and
fora, respectively.
85. Atl. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, 796 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (E.D. Wis.
1992).
86. See id. at 1190 ("[A] High Contracting party is a state which is an original signa-
tory to the convention or one which ratified the convention or filed declarations of adherence
to the convention after it went into force (citation omitted). Further, a declaration of adherence
to the convention by a state may include colonies or territories of that state.").
87. Lee v. China Airlines, Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 980-82 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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since both of them "adhere to" the Convention." The court's use of the
phrase "adhere to" erroneously suggests that Taiwan was a party to the
Warsaw Convention. Subsequently, in Atlantic Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, a court found the Warsaw Convention applicable because of the
PRC's declaration that the Convention applies to Taiwan, among other
89reasons.
For several reasons, the two district courts misapplied the laws. The
courts ignored the TRA and the jurisprudence establishing that Taiwan's
status is not altered because of derecognition (and hence it should be
treated as a separate entity from the PRC). The district courts' decisions
rest upon an erroneous presumption that the United States' recognition
of the PRC indicates the recognition of the PRC's territorial claim to
Taiwan. 90 On the contrary, the court in Wong v. Ilchert clearly pointed out
that the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relationship "does not necessarily entail
acceptance of one another's territorial claim.'" 9' As discussed previously,
since the ROC and the PRC are separate States in the divided China,
holding the ROC bound to treaties concluded by the PRC violates a ba-
sic premise of international law that "[a] treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent."
92
Understanding the errors made by the district courts, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
UPS concluded that courts should defer to the executive branch's deter-
mination that Taiwan should not be bound by the PRC's adherence to the
Warsaw Convention.9 The court pointed out that the U.S. government
confirmed the spirit of the TRA by listing China and Taiwan separately
in Treaties in Force, published by the State Department.94 This decision
88. Id. at 984.
89. Atd. Mutual Ins. Co., 796 E Supp. at 1191. For detailed discussions regarding these
two cases, see Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959,
978-80 (2000); Andy Y. Sun, Revisiting Taiwan's Legal Status in the United States: The Im-
pact of the Taiwan Relations Act on Private Disputes, 17 CHINESE YB INT'L L. & AFF. 68,
72-74, 77-81 (1998-99).
90. In re Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. AFS Cycle & Co., 190 BR. 599, 611 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1995) ("The reasoning in Atlantic Mutual was flawed. Its main error in the conclusory state-
ment that the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China means that the
United States' recognizes its territorial claim to the island of Taiwan.").
91. Wong v. llchert, 998 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1993).
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 34.
93. Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1145-47 (9th
Cir. 1999); Eric Schwarz, Recent Decision, Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United
Parcel Serv. & United Parcel Int'l., Inc., 177 F.3D 1142 (9th Cir. 1999), 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
133, 133 (2000).
94. Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 177 F.3d at 1146 (" 'China' is listed as a signatory
to the Warsaw Convention, while 'China (Taiwan)' is not.").
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has had a profound impact in both US courts95 and foreign courts. As of
now, German and Italian courts have found the Warsaw Convention in-
applicable to shipments between Germany, Italy and Taiwan because the
ROC on Taiwan is distinguishable from the PRC.96
Because the United States and Taiwan have significant political and
trade relationships, the number of judicial decisions by U.S. courts con-
cerning Taiwan's sovereignty is the largest in the world, both before and
after recognition. The TRA provides a comprehensive scheme under
which the two nations maintain their ties to each other. Relying on the
TRA, U.S. courts have established the principle that Taiwan is regarded
as a State, and its immunities and other interests remained unscathed
following derecognition.
2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom does not have a statute similar to the Taiwan
Relations Act. Instead, by basing judicial interpretations of Taiwan's
status on the common law, British courts have granted Taiwan State
status, thus achieving the same result as the US courts achieved through
interpreting the TRA. The United Kingdom was one of the first Western
countries that switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC. In 1950,
the United Kingdom formally extended recognition to the PRC, and si-
multaneously severed relations with the ROC on Taiwan. 97 In 1972, the
United Kingdom and the PRC signed the Joint Communique recognizing
the PRC "as the sole legal government of China," and subsequently re-
moved its official consulate in Taiwan. 98
95. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374,
380 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Mingtai Fire, 177 F.3d at 1146-47) (finding Annex 13 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation not applicable because Taiwan is not a party);
Leenardo v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., 140 Fed. Appx. 661,664 (2005) (citing Mingtai Fire, 177
F.3d at 1145).
96. See Landgericht Monchengladbach (9 0 58/87) (Feb. 24, 1988), 1988 TRANSR 283
(German); Fratelli v. Thai Airways, Alitalia, Tribunale di Naples, 23. 4. 1983 n. 2850, (1889)
AIR L. 213 (Italian) Cf., cited in Zheng Huang, Theory and Practice of the International Air
Carrier Liability Regime-A Critical Analysis of the Nagoya District Judgment on China
Airlines B1816 Accident, Dec. 26, 2003, 2 TAIWAN INT'L. L. QUARTERLY, 2 (2005) (question-
ing Japan's Nagoya District Court's decision that the Warsaw Convention applies to Taiwan
when considering the crash of China Airlines B 1816).
97. Frangoise Mengin, A Function Relationship: Political Extension to Europe-Taiwan
Economic Ties, 169 CHINA Q. 136, 137 (2002); Eberhard Sandschnieder, China's Diplomatic
Relations with the States of Europe, 169 CHINA Q. 33, 35 (2002).
98. See 196 Pal. Deb., HC (6th ser.) (1991) 293, reprinted in [1991] 62 BRITISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 568 ("As was set out in the 1972 Joint Communiqu6 with the [PRC], the British gov-
ernment recognize the Government of the [PRC] as the sole legal government of China, and
acknowledges the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China."); see also 238 Pal. Deb. (6th ser.) (1994) 936 reprinted in [1994] 65
BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 589 ("In our view the status of Taiwan is a matter for Peking and Taipei
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Since derecognition, the British courts have become a model for
other common law jurisdictions on how to deal with the Taiwan ques-
tion. British courts established precedents as to foreign States that the
executive branch does not recognize. The leading case is Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd.,99 before the House of Lords. The piv-
otal issue was whether the plaintiff corporation, incorporated under the
laws of the German Democratic Republic, had legal capacity to sue in
British courts.' °° At the time of suit, the British government did not rec-
ognize the German Democratic Republic. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff corporation, as a "non-person," lacked standing before British
courts. Subsequently in a similar case, the Court of Appeals in GUR
Corporations v. Trust Bank of America dealt with a similar standing is-
sue involving the Ciskei government in South Africa.'0 ' The issue was
that the British government did not recognize Ciskei because it was es-
tablished by South Africa during apartheid, also known as "separate
development."'0 2
In both cases, the British courts avoided the rule that courts are
bound by the government's policy to decline recognition to certain State-
like entities. In Carl Zeiss, the House of Lords held that since the United
Kingdom still recognized the Soviet Union, the German Democratic
Republic could be considered to be a "subordinate body" acting in the
name of the Soviet Union.' 3 Following the same reasoning, in GUR
Corporations, the court concluded that the acts of Ciskei were assumed
to be those of South Africa, which the British government still
recognized.3 Collectively, the cases established the Carl Zeiss doctrine,
to resolve between themselves."); High Court Action No. 5805 of 1991: Questions by the
Court about the Status of Taiwan, [1996] 67 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 716-17 (Her majesty's
government does not recognize Taiwan or deal with the government in Taipei, there are only
non-official representative offices between the United Kingdom and Taiwan). The United
Kingdom operates the non-official British Trade and Cultural Office in Taipei and its Taiwan-
ese counterpart in London was established under the name, "Trade Representative Office." Id.
at 717.
99. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd., [1967] 1 A.C. 853 (H.L.); see also
Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Prac-
tice, 63 BRITISH YB. INT'L L. 231, 248-61 (1992) (discussing English law regarding
recognition of foreign states).
100. Ivan Shearer, International Legal Relations between Australia and Taiwan: Behind
and FaCade, 21 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L 113, 125 (2000). See also Jochen Abr. Frowein,
From Two to One-Germany and the United Nations, 46 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 22 (2003)
("The Three Western Powers ... made it clear to the newly established German Government
that it could not be recognized as the de jure government of all Germany, a position again
formally upheld in the statement of the British Foreign Secretary in the famous Carl Zeiss
case.").
101. GUR Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa, (1987) Q.B. 599 (Court of Appeal).
102. Shearer, supra note 100, at 126.
103. Carl Zeiss Stiftung, at 959.
104. GUR Corp., supra note 101.
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under which unrecognized States may be "recognized" for limited
105purposes.
The Carl Zeiss doctrine does not, and should not, apply to disputes
involving Taiwan. In both Carl Zeiss and GUR Corporations, the courts
ruled that the acts of the unrecognized entities were assumed to be acts
of States that the United Kingdom recognized. In both cases, the subor-
dinate States were "created on the initiative and with consent of' the
parent States. 0 6 Taiwan's situation is different.' °7 The ROC was not cre-
ated by the PRC or established because of the PRC's consent. Both the
executive and legislative practice of the United Kingdom supports this
view.
While the British government "recognizes" the PRC as the only le-
gitimate government of China, similar to the position of the U.S.
government, it simply "acknowledges" the PRC's position that Taiwan is
part of the PRC.00 The British government carefully chose the word "ac-
knowledges," which signifies no more than the statement that "we
understand, although may not agree with, your position," as opposed the
word "recognizes," which carries far greater legal implications. In addi-
tion, it is the long-standing practice of the British government, even in
the absence of diplomatic relations, to recognize the "existence of Tai-
wanese authorities and their effective control over Taiwan." ' 9 For
instance, in March 1986, to ensure that British products be entitled to
copyright protection in Taiwan under the reciprocal requirement of the
ROC Copyright Law, the United Kingdom enacted an order granting
Taiwanese products copyright protection." 0 Recognition of Taiwanese
law demonstrates the United Kingdom's-at least limited-recognition
of the ROC as the government of Taiwan.
105. See generally Alona E. Evans, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VE.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena. 293
FSupp. 892., 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1969).
106. Shearer, supra note 100, at 126.
107. See id. ("The situation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) is historically and legally
quite different."); Talmon, supra note 99, at 259 n. 161 ("Especially as the Taiwanese authori-
ties cannot be regarded as a subordinate body or an agent set up by the entity which Her
Majesty's Government considers as entitled to exercise governing authority over the territory
of Taiwan.").
108. In the 1972 Joint Communique with the PRC, the British government recognizes
the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, and acknowledges the position of
the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. 196 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)
(1991) 293, reprinted in [1991] 62 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 568. See Text of Joint Communique,
Feb. 27, 1972 DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1972, 437 [hereinafter Shanghai Communique] ("The
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there
is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.").
109. Talmon, supra note 99, at 259 n. 161.
110. Id. at 259-60.
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British courts are cognizant of Taiwan's unique situation and have
never applied the Carl Zeiss doctrine to cases involving Taiwan. The
only common law court that applied the Carl Zeiss doctrine to Taiwan
may be the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong's Supreme
Court after the takeover of the PRC in 1997."' In the Chen Li Hung v.
Ting Lei Miao, the Court gave effect to a Taiwanese court's bankruptcy
order."2 The court stated that Taiwan is "under de jure sovereignty of'
the PRC, but is currently "under the defacto albeit unlawful control of a
usurper government.""' 3 It then opined that giving effect to the bank-
ruptcy order, which was made by "the usurper regime or courts in
Taiwan," would promote China's reunification and was "necessary as a
matter of common sense and justice.""4 The court's reasoning should be
read with caution however, given the fact that Hong Kong is now a spe-
cial administrative region of the PRC, and its courts' judicial
interpretations are confined by the PRC's "one country, two systems"
structure.'
The first British case involving the ROC on Taiwan was also related
to Hong Kong." 6 Sitting in London and functioning as the court of last
resort of Hong Kong before the Chinese takeover, the Privy Council
7
was asked to determine an appeal from the Supreme Court of Hong
Ill. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China art. 82 ("The power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region .... ").
112. Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R 9, 21 (C.F.A.). See Rong-
Chwan Chen, A Boat on a Troubled Strait: The Interregional Private Law of the Republic of
China on Taiwan, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J. 599, 627-32 (1998) (introducing recognition of Taiwan
and its judgment in Hong Kong courts); see also C.L. Lim, Non-Recognition of Putative For-
eign States (Taiwan) under Singapore's State Immunity Act, 11 ASIAN Y.B. INT'L 3, 7 (2003-
04) ("[The case] may be seen recently to have chosen to follow the broad approach taken in
Carl Zeiss and GUR.").
113. Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 9, 21 (C.F.A.) (emphasis in
the original).
114. Id. at 21, 25. The Court also pointed out that, even China, under the Rules of the
Supreme Court People's Court passed on January 15, 1998, extends recognition to civil judg-
ments delivered in Taiwan. Id. at 19.
115. See Stephen J. Yates, Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: Testimony before the East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee-Foreign Relations Committee-United States
Senate, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, July 1, 1999, available at http://www.heitage.org/research/
asiaandthepacific/testO7Ol99.cfm.
116. Civil Air Transport, Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp., [1953] AC 70 (P.C. 1952).
See generally Paul Abel, Civil Air Transport Incorporated v. Central Air Transport Corpora-
tion, 2 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 136 (1953).
117. See generally Commonwealth Jurisdiction, available at http://www.privy-
council.org.uk/output/Page32.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (introducing the Privy Council's
jurisdiction). After 1997, Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal replaced the Privy Council as
the highest court of appeal in Hong Kong. M. Lucy Tan, From the Privy Council to the Court
of Final Appeal: Will the Area of Non-Justiciability be the Same in Hong Kong after July 1,
1997?, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.R. 413,414 (1997).
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Kong. The issue was whether the ROC's sale of 40 civil aircraft in Hong
Kong to an American company, made on December 12, 1949, less than a
month before the United Kingdom terminated diplomatic relations with
the ROC on Taiwan, was still valid after derecognition. The defendant
was the Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC), an ROC aircraft en-
terprise, which owned forty airplanes in Hong Kong. In November 1949,
most CATC employees defected to the communist government."' To
avoid these aircrafts being taken by the PRC, the ROC government,
which had by then retreated to Taiwan, sold them to a Delaware corpora-
tion formed by US citizens. "9 The American company sought a
declaratory judgment that the aircrafts were its property. Since lower
courts ruled against the company, finding that the sale was made "not in
good faith ... but for an alien and improper purpose,, 2 and subse-
quently dismissed the company's review request, the company appealed
to the Privy Council.
The Privy Council overruled the lower courts' decisions and upheld
the validity of the transaction at issue. The Privy Council found that, at
the time of the sale, the ROC was recognized by the UK as the sole de
jure government of China and, therefore, the validity of the ROC's sales
should not be reviewed by British courts. In particular, the Privy Council
stressed that the lower court's examination of whether the ROC govern-
ment was "alive to the probability of the withdrawal of recognition of
[the British] government in the near future" was flawed because such
consideration is "a matter of speculation."'' 2' Moreover, while retroactiv-
ity of recognition may validate acts of a de facto government, which
later received recognition, it cannot "invalidate acts of the previous de
jure government," such as the ROC.' 22 The Privy Council's decision in
Civil Air Transport soon became significant international law precedent.
When the US Congress debated the ownership of the ROC's embassy
118. See Civil Air Transport, [1953] A.C. 70 ("On Nov. 9, 1949, the then president of
C.A.T.C., Mr. Chen flew from Hong Kong to Peking and transferred his allegiance to the de
facto communist government. About the same time, the majority of C.A.T.C.'s employees in
Hong Kong also defected from the nationalist government .... ). The PRC premier also de-
clared the aircraft to be property of new China and asked employees of the C.A.T.C. to stay in
Hong Kong to "bear the responsibility of protecting the assets." Id.
119. One of them is pro-Nationalist US General Claire Chennault, who went to China in
WWII and became the commander of the American Volunteer Group, better known as the
"Flying Tigers." See, e.g. http://www.flyingtigersavg.com/tigerl.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2008).
120. Civil Air Transport, [1953] A.C. 70.
121. Id. This analysis is similar to the act of state doctrine in US courts.
122. Id; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (noting that recogni-
tion of a new government does not nullify earlier transactions made with a prior government);
Gdynia Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski, [1952] 2 All E.R. 470 (upholding a self-serving trans-
action by a soon-to-be unrecognized government).
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property, which had been sold to a private association, the holding in
Civil Air Transport played an important role in passing certain provi-
sions of the Taiwan Relations Act, which avoided the retroactive
invalidation of the embassy sale.
23
The court in Reel v. Holder again confronted sovereignty issues in-
volving Taiwan.' 24 The case concerned Taiwan's membership in the
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), an international ath-
letic association established in 1912 with its headquarters in the United
Kingdom. The pivotal issue was the interpretation of Article I of the
IAAF charter, which provides that "[o]nly one member for each country
can be affiliated."'25 The All China Athletic Association in Beijing (PRC
Association) was elected to be a member of the IAAF in 1954, and a
similar association from Taiwan (ROC Association) was also admitted in
1956. Although the PRC Association withdrew its membership in 1958
because of Taiwan's accession, the IAAF passed a resolution in 1978
accepting reification of the PRC Association and recognizing it as the
only body governing both mainland China and Taiwan. 126 The ROC As-
sociation sought a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the
resolution. The British courts were asked to determine whether Taiwan
still retained its membership or if it was wrongfully excluded.
The court first referred to other provisions of the IAAF Charter for
guidance. According to the court, the IAAF Rule does not entertain the
notion of "sovereign states in the international sense."'' 27 The membership
of an athletic association is valid if "it is the supreme athletic association
for that territory and is not subject to any control by another athletic as-
sociation.' 28 The court further noted that the jurisdiction of an athletic
123. See Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (1979) ("The absence of diplomatic
relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or
otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those in-
volving contracts ... ) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by
or with respect to Taiwan.") (emphasis added). From a military point of view, this case is even
more crucial to the ROC's retreated forces in Taiwan. The ROC government was greatly con-
cerned that if the PRC had gained control of the aircrafts, it would have immediately
possessed the capability to attack Taiwan, which had no air-defense system.
124. Reel v. Holder, [1981] 3 All E.R. 321.
125. James Crawford, Decisions in British Courts during 1979 Involving Questions of
Public or Private International Law 50 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 217, 217 (1979).
126. See Reel, 3 All E.R. at 321.
127. Id. In particular, the court considered the following provisions. Article 7 provides
that "[t]he National Governing Body for amateur athletics in any country shall be eligible for
members of the Federation (emphasis added)." Article 9(7) further states that an affiliated
member can be a "colony" See id. at 322 (declaring that Taiwan could be a member of the
International Badminton Federation and the decision did not involve international law or sov-
ereignty).
128. See id. at 321.
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association is confined by the "political boundaries of the country."'2 9
The court thus held that Taiwan and China are separate countries and,
therefore, jurisdiction of one does not extend to the other. Thus, the
IAAF's resolution erroneously excluded Taiwan. " °
The British courts' decisions are of great significance because, with-
out a statutory basis, the courts have used their common law analysis to
achieve the same result that the TRA does in U.S. courts. By stating that
the use of the word "country" or "national" in a statute does not exclude
Taiwan, the court recognized that the ROC continued to exist on Taiwan
despite derecognition. British courts also noted that the PRC and ROC
are separate jurisdictions and that the two States should be therefore
treated independently. This refutes the PRC's claim that it has jurisdic-
tion over Taiwan.
3. Canada
Canada established formal relations with the PRC on October 13,
1970, recognizing it as the sole legal government of China and "took
note of" the PRC's view that Taiwan is an "inalienable part of the terri-
tory" of the PRC. 3' Again, the term "[took] note of' shows that the
Canadian government never "recognized" the PRC's territorial claim
over Taiwan. 32 The proposed "Taiwan Affairs Act," which copied many
sections from the Taiwan Relations Act, was introduced into Parliament
and passed the first reading in 2006.'3 However, due to the holding of
129. See id. at 325. (quoting Article 1(2)) (stipulating that "[tihe jurisdiction of members
of the Federation shall be limited to the political boundaries of the country they represent."
The court opined that "if Wales formed their own independent amateur athletic association and
wanted to be separately represented .... Wales would be a 'country' ... under the rules of the
IAAF.") See Crawford, supra note 125, at 218 ("It is doubtful whether the boundary between,
say, Wales and England could be described as 'political' ... His Lordship did not expressly
consider whether the 'boundary' between Taiwan and the mainland could be described as a
'political' one.").
130. See Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 771
(1980) (holding that the question of whether a local International Olympic Committee should
be allowed to display the ROC flag to be a political question beyond the court's power to re-
view).
131. COLIN MACKERRAS & AMANDA YORKE, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEM-
PORARY CHINA 152 (Cambridge 2001).
132. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that "[o]ur position....
which was made clear to Chinese from the start of the negotiations, is that the Canadian Gov-
ernment does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese
Government's position on the status of Taiwan." L.C. Green, Representation versus Member-
ship: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations, 10 CANADIAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 128-29
(1972).
133. Jim Abbot, a member of Canada's Conservative Party, introduced the Bill C-357 to
provide "an improved framework for economic, trade, cultural and other initiatives between
the people of Canada and the people of Taiwan." Taiwan Affairs Bill Can Be Revived, avail-
able at http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xltem=21785&CtNode= 122 (last visited Mar.
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the general election, the bill, as with other legislative bills under consid-
eration, died on the order paper of the Congress.'34 Canada's judicial
system is based both on British common law and on European civil
law. "'35 Both of the two distinctive legal systems encountered the Taiwan
question and, interestingly, ruled similarly.
The first leading Canadian case involving the status of Taiwan was
Romania v. Cheng, which went through the common law system.'36 A
vessel named Maersk Dubai that was registered in Taiwan arrived in
Nova Scotia, Canada on May 24, 1996.' 37 Canadian police arrested the
captain and crew, who were nationals of Taiwan, after learning that three
Romanian stowaways were thrown overboard during two voyages from
Spain to Canada. Romania charged the Taiwanese suspects with murder
and, based on the Romania-Canada Extradition Treaty, requested that
Canada extradite them to Romania."' Taiwan applied to the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court for permission to intervene in the case, arguing that un-
der international law, the case was under Taiwan's jurisdiction because
the alleged crimes were committed on the high seas and, as a flag State,
Taiwan had exclusive jurisdiction over this subject matter. 9 The PRC
also asked for the suspects on the basis of its jurisdiction over Taiwan.'4
°
The court found that Canada was not obliged to extradite the
Taiwanese suspects to Romania because the crimes were not committed
within Romania's jurisdiction or territory. '' It thus granted Taiwan
23, 2008); see also Delegation of Canadian MPs Urged to Support Taiwan, TAIPEI TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2005, at Al (stating that Taiwan's president "urged Canada to pass a law to legalize
its unofficial with Taipei."); China Fears for Passage of Taiwan Affairs Act by Canada Parlia-
ment, available at http://www.roc-taiwan.org/uk/TaiwanUpdate/nsl 151005s.htm (reporting
that China's ambassador warned that the Act would damage China-Canada relations); Nancy
Hughes Anthony, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Letter to Members to Parliament, Aug.
26, 2005 (arguing that passage of the bill would be harmful to Canada's negotiations for
tourism and investment agreements with China), available at http://www.chamber.ca/
article.asp?id-181#letters (follow "Aug. 26, 2005 to Members of Parliament re: Bill C-357"
hyperlink).
134. Taiwan Affairs Bill Can Be Revived, supra note 133.
135. Where Our Legal Systems Comes From, Canada's System of Justice, available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/Just/03.html.
136. Romania v. Cheng [1997] N.S.R.2d 13, 45 (Can.), reprinted in 15 CHINESE Y.B.
INT'L L. & AFF. 111-140 (1996-97).
137. Hungdah Chiu et al., Transfer to the Republic of China of the Detainees Involved in
the Maersk Dubai Case in Canada, in 15 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. 103 (1996-97).
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPHENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAw 734 (9th ed. 1992) ("Jurisdiction on the high seas is thus dependent upon the maritime
flag under which vessels sail.. ").
140. Angeline G. Chen, Taiwan's International Personality: Crossing the River by Feel-
ing the Stones, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 223, 237-38 (1998).
141. Under the Extradition Act, Canada is obliged to extradite a "fugitive"-"a person
being or suspected of being in Canada, who is accused or convicted of an extradition crime
committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state." Transfer to the Republic of China of the
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jurisdiction over the case despite the lack of diplomatic relations
between Canada and Taiwan. 142 This case shows that Canada's
derecognition does not bar judicial cooperation with Taiwan. This
principle was also confirmed outside Canada in a case where the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court granted Taiwan judicial assistance. There, the
court stressed that "[t]he absence of recognition and of diplomatic
relations... does not mean that [such assistance] would be forbidden."'
'"
Moreover, Canada's civil law Quebec Superior Court in Parent v.
Singapore Airlines affirmed Taiwan's sovereign immunity based upon
Canada's State Immunity Act.4 5 The plaintiff in Parent brought action
against Singapore Airlines (SAL) for injuries resulting from a crash in
Taiwan. SAL, in turn, sued in warranty against Taiwan's Civil Aeronau-
tics Administration (CAA), claiming that the CAA should be liable for
the accident because of its mismanagement. The CAA argued that, as a
government agency, it was entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of
Canadian courts. The court turned to Canada's Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, inquiring whether Taiwan was a foreign State.'4 6 The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs replied that, pursuant to its one-China policy, Canada
recognizes the PRC and has no diplomatic ties with Taiwan or the
ROC.'4 7 Despite the government's reply, the court held that it was not the
exclusive province of the executive branch to decide whether a foreign
entity is a State under the State Immunity Act. The court found that Tai-
wan satisfied the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo
Convention. Additionally, it ruled that based on bilateral official deal-
ings, the. Canadian government in practice recognizes Taiwan's
Detainees Involved in the Maersk Dubai Case in Canada, 1996-97, 15 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L.
115. Article I of the Canada-Romanian Treaty provides that "[t]he High Contracting parties
engage to deliver up to each other those persons who, being accused or convicted of a crime or
offense committed in the territory of one Party, shall be found within the territory of the other
party, under the circumstances and conditions stated in the present treaty." Id. at 124.
142. Subsequently, the Canadian government transferred the suspects in custody to Tai-
wanese officials in Canada. Following the decision of the Canadian court, Taiwan's Kaohsiung
Public Prosecutors' Office issued criminal summons for the suspects to appear before the
prosecutors and subsequently indicted the captain. For information on the indictments, see The
Synopsis by the Prosecutor in the Maersk Dubai Case at the Kaohsiung District Court of
Taiwan, Republic of China, 1998-99 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. 105-134; see also 15 CHINESE
Y.B. INT'L L., supra note 141, at 109 ("The Canadian Government's actions [are] in full ac-
cordance with International Law. There is no jurisdiction for Canadian courts under either
Canadian or International Law.").
143. See generally Marc Henzelin, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Swit-
zerland and Taiwan: The Andrew and others Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 790 (2005).
144. Tribunal Frdral [Federal Court] May 3, 2004, 130 Arrfts du Tribunal Frdral
Suisse 11217 (Switz.), translated in Henzelin, supra note 143, at 793.
145. Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] R.J.Q. 1330.
146. Olufemi A. Elias, The International Status of Taiwan in the Court of Canada and




"effective political independence.' '4 8 Therefore, the court found that Tai-
wan was a "foreign state" within the meaning of the State Immunity Act
and dismissed the SAL's action in warranty.1
4 9
4. Japan
Japan's legal system is modeled after European civil law. 50 Japan did
not enact a statute similar to the Taiwan Relations Act nor does it con-
sider common law rulings to be of precedential value. Nonetheless,
similar to their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom
and Canada, Japanese courts have accorded Taiwan State status in spite
of derecognition.
After World War II, the ROC concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan
restoring diplomatic relations between the two nations. This treaty was
nullified in 1972 when Japan signed the Joint Communique with the
PRC recognizing the Beijing government as China's sole legitimate gov-
ernment. '' The most significant Japanese case involving Taiwan is
Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, commonly known as the Kokaryo
case. This case involved the title of the Kokaryo dormitory for Chinese
students. During World War II, Kyoto University rented the property for
Chinese students. The ROC purchased it in 1952 for the same purpose.1
5 2
After Japan's recognition of the PRC in 1972, pro-Beijing students oc-
cupied the dormitory, which caused the ROC government to file a
148. Id. at 95.
149. It is worth noting that in a similar case, Singapore's Ministry Foreign Affairs de-
clined to issue a certificate addressing the issue whether Taiwan was a foreign state for
statutory purposes. The courts held that whether or not a foreign entity is entitled to sovereign
immunity was "within the exclusive province of the executive." Woo Anthony v. Singapore
Airlines Ltd. and other actions, [2003] 3 S.G.H.C. 688, para. 22, available at
http://www.singaporelaw.ng/rss/judg/28602.html. As the government's position as to Taiwan's
status was vague and inconclusive, the court ruled that Taiwan was not a foreign state within
the meaning of Singapore's State Immunity Act of 1985. It is interesting to observe that both
courts in Singapore and Canada followed "the one voice doctrine" under which the court
should defer to the executive branch as to recognition, but ruled differently. See Elias, supra
note 146, at 96-97 (detailing the case). The Singaporean court not only misinterpreted "no
voice," i.e. the government's silence on the status of Taiwan, as "a voice," but also failed to
consider Singapore's other official dealings with Taiwan. See also Lim, supra note 112, at 10
("The learned judge added that the suggestion that de facto recognition is of 'equal impor-
tance' for the purposes of the Act may also be something of 'an exaggerated idea.' ").
150. Japan is "modeled after German civil law system with English-American influ-
ence." CIA World Factbook, Field Listing-Legal System, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html (last visited May 7, 2008).
151. Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the People's Republic of
China, Point 2, Sept. 29, 1972, M.O.FA. Pursuant to the Communique, Japan continues
"working relations with Taiwan on a non-governmental basis." THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS JAPAN, DIPLOMATIC BLUEBOOK 2006, 47 (2006).
152. X. v. Taiwan (Republic of China), 31 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L. L. 201 (Osaka
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1987).
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lawsuit demanding that the students leave the premises. The case soon
became one of the most prominent cases concerning State succession in
Japan and abroad. Japanese courts were asked to determine two issues
regarding the two Chinas. First, after Japan's derecognition of the ROC,
did the ROC still have the capacity to sue in Japanese courts? Second,
should the PRC, the government that Japan recognizes, succeed owner-
ship of the property purchased by the ROC?
On the standing issue, the Kyoto District Court in 1977 dismissed
the case. It ruled that since Japan switched recognition to the PRC, the
ROC government in Taiwan possessed no right to protect the property at
issue in Japan.' The district court's decision was overruled by the Osaka
High Court, which found that the ROC had the capacity to be a party to
the suit. The court noted trade relations between Taiwan and Japan and
found that it would be "most reasonable" to admit Taiwan's standing in
private legal disputes. 54 Furthermore, in the court's view, recognizing
Taiwan's standing to bring suit does not hinder the government's recog-
nition of the PRC.'55 The case was then remanded to the district court.
In 1986, the Kyoto District Court found that, since the ROC still
dominates Taiwan, Japan's recognition of the PRC "followed an incom-
plete succession of government."'5 6 Thus the ROC kept its property right
to the dormitory and was entitled to exercise that right in Japan. The
Osaka High Court reaffirmed this decision and elaborated further on the
theory of "incomplete succession." The court explained that under this
theory, the old government's assets abroad are "not necessarily suc-
ceeded to the new government, for the latter does not dominate them
while the former still exists."' 57 The court also found that while the assets
abroad "representing the country" or being "used for the exercise of state
powers" should succeed to the new government upon the change of rec-
ognition, other assets should be retained by the old government. 
58
Considering the fact that the ROC, as the old government, still efficiently
controls Taiwan and adjacent islands, and that the dormitory was not a
"diplomatic asset," the court concluded that despite the switch of recog-
nition, the ROC "has not lost the ownership right to the property."'5 9
Subsequently, the PRC filed an appeal to the Japanese Supreme Court in
153. See generally Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 22 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L.
151-56 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Sept. 16, 1977).
154. Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 33 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 186 (Kyoto
Dist. Ct., Apr. 13, 1982).
155. Id.
156. Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 33 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 188 (Kyoto
Dist. Ct., Feb. 4, 1986).
157. See CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L. L. AND AFF., Vol. 11 (1991-92) at 249, para. 3.
158. Id.
159. Id. at para 1.
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1987. At this point, the Supreme Court has not heard or dismissed the
160
case.
The procedural decision recognizing the ROC's capacity to sue is in
line with case law in the other jurisdictions discussed above. More le-
gally interesting is the courts' substantive decision about the ROC's title
over the Kokaryo dormitory and the Japanese courts' application of the
innovative theory of "incomplete succession." Upholding the ROC's
property title, Japanese courts refuted the PRC's claim that it replaced
the ROC under international law.'6 Beijing heavily attacked the Kokaryo
case as violating the Japan-PRC Joint Communique, which recognizes
the PRC as the only de jure government of China.'62 The PRC's position
is flawed, however, because in the Joint Communique, Japan simply
"understands and respects," rather than "recognizes," the PRC's territo-
rial claim over Taiwan. 63 Hence, the Kokaryo case reaffirms that the
ROC's State status was not altered as a result of derecognition.
B. Emerging Customary International Law
Based on the foregoing cases, I argue that treating the ROC on Tai-
wan as a distinct State for purposes of judicial proceedings has risen to
the level of customary international law. This creates a binding effect on
domestic and international courts. Customary international law is con-
sidered to be "the oldest and the original source of international law."'
6
4
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, the ICJ is bound to apply "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law" when deciding issues of international
law.'65 Evidence of custom is demonstrated by showing two essential
elements: 1) generality of the State practice and 2) Opinio Juris.
'66
160. Jianming Shen, Revisiting the Disability of the Non-Recognized in the Courts of the
Non-Recognizing States and Beyond: The Departure of the In Re Guanhua Liao Courts From
the Rules, 5 FLA. INT'L J. 401,411 (1990).
161. See Taiwan Issues, Core of Sino-Japanese Relations: Experts, PEOPLE'S DAILY,
Aug. 5, 2002, available at http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/05/eng/20020805-
100916.shtml (stating that the PRC replaced the ROC in 1949 and the PRC "is the only sover-
eign state representing China").
162. See Shen, supra note 160, at 412 (arguing that due to treaties concluded between
the PRC and Japan, Taiwan lost all international rights that a government enjoys).
163. Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the People's Republic of
China, Point 3, Sept. 29, 1972, M.O.F.A.
164. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 139, at 25.
165. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter the ICJ Statute] ("The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such disputes as are subsumed to it, shall apply: ... (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law......
166. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 139, at 27.
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To satisfy the generality of the State practice, the conduct of States
should be regular and consistent. 67 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the
ICJ found that a 12-mile fishery zone limit had become "generally ac-
cepted" and "an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of
preferential rights for coastal states.' 68 Similarly, the practice in most
major countries demonstrates that treating Taiwan as a State independent
of the PRC has been widely accepted. While the governments recognize
the PRC as the government of China, they never concede that Taiwan
belongs to the PRC. Instead, the United States and the United Kingdom
"acknowledge," Canada "takes note of," and Japan "understands and re-
spects" the PRC's territorial claim over Taiwan. They carefully chose
these non-legally-binding phrases to avoid downgrading the ROC's State
status and to maintain the same level of substantive, albeit unofficial,
relations with Taiwan. The recognition of Taiwan's de facto independ-
ence is even more significant from a judicial perspective. Courts across
the world deem Taiwan to be a State in judicial proceedings.
Some contend that some governments and courts still hold the view
that the PRC has jurisdiction over Taiwan. In my view, that position ig-
nores that, to form a custom, the practice of states does not have to be
"in absolutely rigorous conformity."'169 International law requires that the
practice of countries "whose interests are specially affected" be "exten-
sive and virtually uniform."' 70 The United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Japan certainly qualify as countries whose interests are spe-
cially affected, given that they are major trading partners with both
China and Taiwan, and are consistently concerned about political situa-
tions across the Taiwan Strait.
As for opinio juris, the statute of the ICJ requires the general prac-
tice to be "accepted as law" by States. Ian Brownlie defines opinio juris
as a "sense of legal obligation," distinct from "motives of courtesy, fair-
ness, or morality."'' 7' This legal obligation is exemplified by a US court's
decision stating that it is obliged to apply law to Taiwan as if it were rec-
ognized. 172 Moreover, courts in the United States, Canada, and
Switzerland explicitly pointed out that Taiwan met the criteria for state-
167. See Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J 266, 276 (Nov. 20). The ICJ in the
Asylum case also emphasized the necessity for constancy and uniformity of usages or prac-
tices before they can be recognized as custom.
168. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 23-26 (July 25).
169. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 n.186 (June
27).
170. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 ILM 340 (1969).
171. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 8.




hood under the Montevideo Convention, and that the absence of recogni-
tion does not diminish Taiwan's status as a nation.' 73 This finding
demonstrates that courts feel they are legally obligated to treat Taiwan as
a State. In turn, this finding buttresses the theory that the ROC and the
PRC are divided States under international law. Since recognition of
Taiwan as a foreign State satisfies two prongs under Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, i.e. State practice and opinio juris, the judicial recognition of
Taiwan's status should be considered an established international cus-
tom. Indeed, no territory in the world should be left in a judicial vacuum.
As Judge Golcuklu pointed out at the European Court of Human Rights,
regardless of the name or classification of the country, "[w]ho today
would deny the existence of Taiwan?"'
7
1
III. TAIWAN'S STANDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS
A. Practice of International Courts
The practice of foreign courts in various legally significant jurisdic-
tions shows that Taiwan should be considered a State in judicial
proceedings. Further, this judicial recognition has risen to the level of
international custom with which international courts are bound to com-
ply. The following sections examine how international courts deal with
the Taiwan question; that is, how Taiwan can access to courts in interna-
tional settings to resolve disputes. They assess, in turn, Taiwan's
standing before the International Court of Justice as a non-UN Member
State; the possibility of bringing a case before the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea; and whether Taiwan can utilize the WTO dispute
settlement system.
1. International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice is the "principle judicial organ of
the United Nations." "' After World War I, nations devastated by the war
173. See N.Y. Chinese TV Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 853 (2d Cir.
199 1)(discussing the criteria for a nation and holding that the absence of derecognition does
not alter Taiwan's status as a nation); Parent Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] R.J.Q.
1330("[Taiwan] easily passes all the traditional tests of international law. The conclusion is
reached that by international law Formosa has achieved statehood."); Tribunal Fdd6ral [Fed-
eral Court] May 3, 2004, 130 Arrts du Tribunal F~dral Suisse II 217 (Switz.) (finding that
Taiwan meets the criteria under the Montevideo Convention).
174. Loizidou v. Turkey 89 Eur. Ct. of H.R. (15318), paras. 148, 149, and 174 (1996).
175. UN Charter art. 92 provides:
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based
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decided to establish a peace resolution mechanism to safeguard long-
standing harmony in the world. The Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) was established under the auspices of the League of Na-
tions. After World War II, recognizing that the world community needed
a more law-oriented, rather than power-oriented, judicial institution,
countries around the globe, including China (represented by the ROC
government), signed the United Nations Charter in which they replaced
the PCIJ with the ICJ. Since its first decision in 1946, Corfu Channel,1
76
the ICJ's decisions and advisory opinions have significantly clarified
international law principles and elaborated upon States' duties and re-... 177
sponsibilities. Therefore, whether or not Taiwan is able to have access
to the ICJ to resolve international disputes is of great importance to the
country.
a. Jurisdiction
The ICJ's jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties. A State
is able to consent to the ICJ jurisdiction by special agreement, by treaties
and conventions, or by the recognition of the Court's compulsory juris-
diction. The legal basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction is contained in Article 36
of the ICJ Statute. According to Article 36(1), the Court's jurisdiction
includes all cases referred by State parties, usually in the form of special
agreement for the specific purpose of submitting the dispute and indicat-
ing the subject of the dispute as well as the parties involved.' In my
view, the ICJ should have jurisdiction over cases regarding Taiwan, de-
spite the fact that the country is not a party to the ICJ Statute. Based on
Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, Taiwan may accept the ICJ's jurisdiction
by concluding treaties or conventions that require that disputes that arise
from those agreements to be subject to the ICJ's jurisdiction.' 79 Provi-
sions of two treaties that Taiwan concluded, Article XXVIII of the 1946
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an inte-
gral part of the present Charter.
176. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9)(involving Albania's state re-
sponsibility for the explosion of mines and resulting damage to British property in territorial
waters, where Albania knew of the mine at issue.
177. Since 1946, the ICJ has issued 92 judgments and 25 advisory opinions. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Nov. 23, 2006, available at http://www.icj.cig.org/icjwww7
igeneralinformation.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
178. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 36(1) ("[T]he Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.").
179. See Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/
index.php?pl=5&p2=l&p3=2(last visited Mar. 23, 2008) ("Such cases normally come before
the Court by notification to the Registry of an agreement known as a special agreement and
concluded by the parties specially for this purpose.").
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ROC-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN
Treaty) and Article 2 of the 1947 ROC-Philippines Treaty of Amity, con-
fer jurisdiction over bilateral disputes on the ICJ. 8° Although the Treaty
of Amity may have been rescinded because of derecognition of the ROC
by the Philippines, both U.S. and Taiwanese courts have consistently
recognized the validity of the ROC-U.S. FCN Treaty.8 Thus, the FCN
Treaty, which meets the requirement of "treaties and conventions in
force" under Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, may enable Taiwan to re-
sort to the ICJ.
The other way of conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ is based upon on
Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute under which a State may accept the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Yet, to resort to this provision, Taiwan
must first become a party to the ICJ Statute. In theory, it is possible for a
non-UN member to be a party to the ICJ Statute under Article 93(2) of
the UN Charter.8 3 In 1946, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution
91 (I), requiring Switzerland to meet certain conditions to become a party
to the ICJ Statute. '8 However, Taiwan would face political obstacles
should it follow Switzerland's approach. Under Article 93(2) of the UN
Charter, Taiwan's accession to the ICJ would have to be decided by the
UN General Assembly on the Security Council's recommendation. Since
the PRC, as a permanent member of the Security Council, possesses veto
power, it is difficult to envision the PRC acquiescing to Taiwan's at-
tempts to become party to the ICJ Statute, particularly given the PRC's
180. Treaty of Amity, China-Phil., art. II, Apr. 18, 1947, 175 U.N.T.S. 364; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of China, U.S.-R.O.C, art. XXVIII, Nov. 4, 1946, 25 U.N.T.S 233. See also International
Court of Justice, Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=
I &p3=4 ("All entries recorded throughout this Section in respect of China... are to be under-
stood in the light of General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971.").
181. See generally Chang v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 506 F.Supp. 975 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, 954 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Connie Guang-Hwa Yang, WTO System and Dispute Settlement, Lecture at the World
Trade Law Association First Asian-Pacific Regional Conference (Oct. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.tradelaw.nccu.edu.tw/ebook/World%20Trade%2OLaw%2OAssociation-First%20A
sian-Pacific%20Regional%20Conference-l.pdf (stating that according to the ROC-US FCN
Treaty, Taiwanese courts in 1984, 1985, and 1990 consistently granted US companies standing
in copyright cases).
182. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 36(2).
183. See U.N Charter, supra note 175, at art. 93(2) (stating that a non-UN Member State
may become a party to the ICJ Statute "on conditions to be determined in each case by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."). For instance, Swit-
zerland and Lichtenstein became parties to the ICJ Statute and participated in the Interhandel
Case and the Nottebohm Case, respectively, before they joined the United Nations.
184. G.A. Res. 91(I), (Dec. 11, 1946) (The UN General Assembly required Switzerland
to (I) accept provisions of the ICJ Statute; 2) accept obligations of a Member of the United
Nations under Article 94 of the Charter; and (3) undertake to contribute to the Court's ex-
penses).
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longstanding position against resolving cross-strait "domestic disputes"
in international settings.
b. Standing for a Non-UN Member
If Taiwan is able to overcome the jurisdiction threshold, it faces a
much thornier challenge before it can resort to the ICJ: obtaining stand-
ing before the Court. A State needs to be a party to the ICJ Statute in
order to try cases before the ICJ. However, as discussed above, it is
unlikely that Taiwan would become a party to the ICJ Statute because of
Chinese pressure. As a result, the fundamental legal knot that Taiwan has
to untie is whether the country, which is not a UN member or a party to
the ICJ Statute, can have its day in court. Strictly legally speaking, the
problem may not be an insurmountable obstacle.
According to Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute, the Court is open to
States that are not party to the ICJ Statute (and likely not UN-members)
subject to conditions determined by the Security Council. 85 According to
Resolution 9, adopted by the Security Council in 1946, a State may de-
posit a declaration with the ICJ accepting its jurisdiction if it indicates
that it would comply with the Court's decisions and obligations under
the UN Charter.8 6 It should be noted that this procedure under Article
35(2) of the ICJ Statute and Resolution 9 of the Security Council is dis-
tinguishable from the procedure pursuant to Article 93(2) of the UN
Charter and Resolution 9 1(1) of the General Assembly. Under the former
procedure, Taiwan's accession to the Court would be decided by the ICJ
alone. Under the latter procedure, whether Taiwan can become a party to
the ICJ Statute hinges upon the decision of the General Assembly, a po-
litical forum where Taiwan has fewer than 30 diplomatic allies.
Therefore, the most plausible legal basis for Taiwan to gain standing
before the ICJ may be Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute and Resolution 9
of the Security Council. The ICJ has never rejected any State's jurisdic-
tion declaration. If Taiwan complies with the conditions set forth in the
Resolution, such as depositing a declaration with the ICJ accepting its
jurisdiction, the ICJ may consider the worldwide judicial recognition of
Taiwan as a State and grant the nation standing before the court. The
case of Taiwan has never been tested. It should be noted that the coun-
try's attempt to file a declaration accepting the ICJ's jurisdiction may
involve the substantial political risk of losing a case in the ICJ. It is true
that if it prevails, the ROC will effectively claim its independent state-
hood because, according to the ICJ Statute, only States can make such a
185. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165 at art. 35(2) ("The conditions under which the
Court shall be open to other states shall.., be laid down by the Security Council .....
186. See S.C. Res. 9 (Oct. 15, 1946).
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declaration. However, if the Court rules against Taiwan, the country's
statehood will be largely undermined because other judicial bodies will
most likely follow the ICJ's precedent.
2. International Tribunal for the Law of Sea
It is important to understand that the stringent State requirements of
the International Court of Justice may exclude some States, such as Tai-
wan, whose international status is disputed. Because this would
undermine the effect of a sound judicial system, a new movement to
broaden the scope of access to judicial proceedings has emerged among
international tribunals. Evidence of this trend is the establishment of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, or Tribunal),
which was created under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Distinct from the ICJ, whose access is limited to State parties, , the
ITLOS is more widely open to "entities" that "confer jurisdiction on the
Tribunal.' '8' For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea pro-
vides that with respect to seabed disputes, the Convention should apply
"mutatis mutandis" to entities other than State Parties. ' Taiwan, as a
maritime power which possesses the world's seventh-largest fishing
fleet,' 90 needs a mechanism to resolve sea disputes. This is important not
only for Taiwan but for other nations who may have disputes with Tai-
wan. 9' Even though Taiwan is not a party to the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea, as a "fishing entity," it has the right to have access to the
Tribunal.
a. Fishing Entity
The term "fishing entity" is a unique concept under international
law. This term specifically applies to Taiwan, and the concept provides a
legal basis for Taiwan to bring suits before the ITLOS. The term first
appeared in the text of the 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement (UN Fish
187. ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 35.1 ("The Court shall be open to the states par-
ties to the present Statute.").
188. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at Annex VI, art. 20, paras. I and
2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (Dec. 10, 1982)(Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea) [hereinafter "ITLOS Statute" or "ITLOS"].
189. Id. at art. 285 ("This section applies to any dispute which pursuant to Part XI, sec-
tion 5, is to be settled in accordance with procedures provided for in this Part. If an entity
other than a State Party is a party to such a dispute, this section applies mutatis mutandis.").
190. International Boat Industry, Key Market Facts: Taiwan-Background Market Data,
available at http://www.ibinews.com/ibinews/key-mkt-facts/keyinfo-taiwan.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2007).
191. See generally Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 37 (1997).
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Stock Agreement).' The major goal of this Agreement is to enforce the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to "ensure the long-term con-
servation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks."'93 As of the beginning of 2007, there are 59 signa-
tories to the UN Fish Stock Agreement. '94 While the Agreement
primarily governs State Parties, 95 Article 1(3) provides that "this Agree-
ment applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish
on the high seas.' 96 Article 17(3) further details the obligations of "fish-
ing entities."'' 97 Since then, the term "fishing entities" has frequently
appeared in other international fishery agreements.'99 Moreover, the
ITLOS stressed in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases that the countries
involved should "make further efforts to reach agreement with other
States andfishing entities" in order to preserve fishing stocks., 99
The question of to whom the term "fishing entities" refers should
trace back to the drafting history of the UN Fish Stock Agreement. No
legislative material specifically explains the definition of fishing entities.
Nonetheless, at a conference in 1996, Poland inquired as to what the
concept of "fishing entities" meant. The chairman responded that it is "a
particular reference to the status of China.' 20 Moritaka Hayashi, the
192. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stock Agreement].
193. Id. at 1547.
194. See Oceans and Law of the Sea, Overview on the United Nations Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
conventionagreements/convention overview fish stocks.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
195. Fish Stock Agreement, supra note 192, at art.I, sec. 2(a) (" 'States Parties' means
States which have consented to be bound by this Agreement and for which the Agreement is in
force.").
196. Id.
197. Id. at art. 17, para. 3 ("States which are members of a subregional or regional fish-
eries management organization ... shall ... request the fishing entities .... Such fishing
entities shall enjoy benefits... ) (emphasis added).
198. See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, art. 9(2), Sept. 5, 2000, 2000 A.T.N.I.F
11 ("A fishing entity referred to in the Agreement .... "); Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Fishery Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean, art. I (i), Aug. 31, 2002,
2002 O.J. (I/234/40) (EC) (" '[F]ishing entity' means any fishing entity referred to in Article
1(3) of the 1995 Agreement... ).
199. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, (N.Z. v. Japan; Aust'l. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 at
para. 90 [hereinafter Int'l. Trib. L. of the Sea 1999] (concerning requests from Australia and
New Zealand for provisional measures against Japan's over fishing of southern bluefin tuna).
200. Song Yahhui, A Refutation of the CCP rational denying Taiwanese Participation in
the WHO (Feb 2003), http:www.csil.org.tw/bbs/Forum200302.pdf. The chairman was Ambas-
sador Statya Nandam of Fiji. Id.
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former director of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea, pointed out that the term "fishing entity" refers to Taiwan. 0 ' This
explanation is also widely supported within academia.2 In addition, it is
noteworthy that even the PRC did not raise objections in the process of
enacting the UN Fish Stock Agreement, in which the term "fishing enti-
ties" first appeared. China's silence, to some extent, also indicates its
acquiescence to the concept of fishing entities. In my view, the reason
for creating the special category for Taiwan reflects a reluctant political
compromise between China's pressure and other nations' desire to incor-
porate Taiwan, a major fishing State, into global regulations.
b. Access to the Tribunal
The notion of Taiwan being a fishing entity is well accepted by the
international community. Relying on its status as a fishing entity, Taiwan
is entitled to access the ITLOS through the dispute settlement provisions
of the international fishery agreements. In 2000, Taiwan, as a fishing
entity, joined the Commission established under the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO Convention).203 The WCPO
Convention states that one of the major purposes of the Commission is to
"promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.,' 2° It further provides that
the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Fish Stock Agreement,
which grants access to the ITLOS, should apply to disputes among
201. Moritaka Hayashi, The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention,
29 OCEAN & COASTAL J. 51, 59 (1995); see also Ronald Barton, The Law of the Sea and Re-
gional Fisheries Organizations, 14 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 333, 351 (1999).
202. See David H. Anderson, The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995-An Initial As-
sessment, 45 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 463, 463-75 (1996); David A. Balton, Strengthening the
Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, 27 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INT'L L., 125, 125-51 (1996); see also Sean D. Murphy,
Conservation of Fish in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 153
(2001) (stating that Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean includes "fishing entities" in order to
cover Taiwan).
203. See Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law, Commission for the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
http://www.intfish.plus.com/orgs/fisheries/wcpfc.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) ("The Com-
mission also provides for participation by fishing entities, which is enabled by means of an
Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities (which was signed by Chinese Taipei on
5 September 2000)."). The western and central Pacific Ocean is an area where Taiwan catches
a significant amount of fish catch and, hence, Taiwan's participation is vital to meet the goal
of the WCPO Convention.
204. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean art. 10, §l(n), Sept. 5, 2000, S. TREATY Doc. No.
109-1 (2005), 40 I.L.M. 278, available at http://www.intfish.plus.com/treaties/westpac.htm.
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members of the Commission. Taiwan may take advantage of this proc-
ess even though it is currently unable to be a party to the UN Fish Stock
Agreement.
In August 2002, Taiwan became a member of the Extended Com-
mission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna as a fishing
entity.2°6 The Extended Commission's resolution provides that disputes
should be resolved by "arbitration or other peaceful means. 2 7 Taiwan is
also poised to join the Antigua Convention 21 through a similar arrange-
ment - as a fishing entity under the name of Chinese Taipei .209 The
Antigua Convention also provides that members are obliged to resolve
disputes through "peaceful means" consistent with international law.1 °
A reasonable interpretation of the term "peaceful means" contained
in the foregoing agreements cannot preclude resolving conflicts before
the ITLOS, the judicial forum recognized to be the most authoritative in
maritime affairs. Thus, Taiwan in its capacity as a fishing entity may rely
on the following provisions. Article 288 of the UN Convention for the
Law of Sea provides that the ITLOS is entitled to jurisdiction over dis-
putes arising from "an international agreement related to the purposes of
this Convention."''2 Article 20 of the ITLOS Statute also permits an en-
tity "other than State Parties" to have access to the Tribunal "pursuant to
any other agreement conferring jurisdiction. '1  Article 21 of the same
Statute further states that the jurisdiction of the ITLOS comprises "all
205. Id. at art. 31 ("The provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part
VIII of the Agreement apply, mutatis mutandis, to any dispute between members of the Com-
mission, whether or not they are also Parties to the Agreement."). It is interesting to note
Annex 1(2), which provides that a dispute involving a fishing entity may be submitted to arbi-
tration according to "the relevant rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration." Id. at annex
1(2). Furthermore, to avoid precedential value of this provision, Annex 1(4) states that "this
Annex relating to participation by fishing entities are solely for the purposes of this Conven-
tion." Id. at annex 1(4).
206. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, http://
www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) ("The Fishing Entity of Taiwan's
membership of the Extended Commission became effective on 30 August 2002.").
207. Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefish Tuna, Resolution
to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Committee, http://www.ccsbt.org/
docs/pdf/about the commission/theExtendedcommission.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
208. Convention for the Establishment of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC), U.S.- Costa Rica, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230 [hereinafter Antigua Convention].
209. The Quarterly Report Apr.- June 2003 of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Com-
mission 3 (2003), available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/IATTCqO32ENG.pdf ("This
resolution calls upon the observer from Taiwan to sign the new IATTC convention 'under the
name Chinese Taipei.' ").
210. See Antigua Convention, supra note 208, art. XXV (2) ("If a dispute is not settled
through such consultation within a reasonable period, the members [may] settle the dispute
through any peaceful means they may agree upon, in accordance with international law.").
211. ITLOS, supra note 189, art. 288, para. 2 (emphasis added).
212. ITLOS, supra note 188, art. 20, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers• , ,• 211
jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
The PRC may argue that according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the term "international agreement" refers to treaties that
are "concluded between States" 214 and, because Taiwan is not a State, the
fishery agreements to which Taiwan is a party do not meet the require-
ment set forth in Article 288 of the UN Convention for the Law of Sea. I
disagree with this argument for the following reasons. The Vienna Con-
vention does not preclude the fisheries agreement from the scope of
international agreements. It clearly stipulates that the rules of that Con-
vention do not apply to certain international agreements, for instance, the
one concluded between States and "other subjects of international
law."2 '5 The Vienna Convention, hence, envisions treaties as only one
type of international agreement. Even if fisheries agreements do not con-
stitute "treaties" in relation to Taiwan, they still qualify as international
agreements within the meaning of Article 288 of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
Additionally, while Article 288 of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea uses the term "international agreements," Articles 20 and 21 of
the ITLOS Statute use the term "any other agreement." The omission of
the adjective "international" enlarges the scope of jurisdiction under
those agreements. As Gudmundur Eiriksson, former president of the
ITLOS asserted, the agreements concluded with "entities whose interna-
tional status is unclear" should fall within the meaning of Article 288.26
As a result, the fishery agreements concluded between foreign States and
Taiwan would constitute international agreements under both the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the ITLOS Statute.
Although Taiwan is not a "Contracting Party"-a term China deems
to have sovereign implications-to the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea and to the UN Fish Stock Agreement, Taiwan is now widely recog-
nized as a fishing entity. Under this new identity, Taiwan is entitled to
the rights other States possess under the multilateral fishery agreements
and, more importantly, is able to resolve its fishing disputes in the
ITLOS on the basis of the dispute settlement provisions of those agree-
ments.
213. ITLOS, supra note 188, art. 21 (emphasis added).
214. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 2(a) (defining a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.")
215. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 3.
216. See GUDMUNDUR EIRIKSSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE
SEA 115 (2000) ("It can be argued that other entities ... would fall under [Article 288(2) of
the Convention], for example, non-governmental organizations or natural or juridical persons
or other entities whose international status is unclear.").
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3. World Trade Organization
In comparison to ICJ jurisdiction, which is limited to the consent of
"States," the broadened jurisdiction under the ITLOS that is extended to
other entities demonstrates the trend toward wider jurisdiction of interna-
tional tribunals. This trend is further evidenced by the creation of the
dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which has evolved into one of the most vibrant global judicial dispute
settlement systems in the past decade. As the 171h largest economy in the
world, it is of great importance that Taiwan be able to utilize the system
to resolve trade quarrels. Taiwan's participation in WTO litigation as a
"separate customs territory" reaffirms that Taiwan is considered to be an
independent entity, even if it is not have the name of State in some judi-
cial proceedings.
The WTO came into existence in 1995 based on the Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), concluded
at the end of the Uruguay Round. The purpose of the WTO is to provide
an integrated framework to its predecessor, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which the ROC was a party, and other cov-
ered agreements. The pivotal innovation of the WTO is the dispute
settlement system based on the new Dispute Settlement Understanding.
The new Dispute Settlement Understanding prescribes the mandatory
jurisdiction over WTO Members. This is different from most interna-
tional tribunals, where jurisdiction is generally bestowed by parties'
211consent.
Should a Member find its rights under any covered agreement im-
paired by another Member, the former may resort to the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism. The Dispute Settlement Understanding requires
the Members to first engage in consultations to try to resolve the dispute
without formal proceedings. If no mutually satisfactory results can be
achieved, a Member may formally request the establishment of a panel
to adjudicate its case.2' The panel is composed of three legal or trade
experts chosen by the parties or appointed by the WTO Director-
General. 2'9 The Dispute Settlement Mechanism also provides a standing
217. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [here-
inafter the DSU or Dispute Settlement Understanding]; see also World Trade Org., A
Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System 8 (2004) (stating that due to the compul-
sory jurisdiction, "no responding party Member may escape from that jurisdiction").
218. See DSU, supra note 217, art. 6.1 ("If the complaining party so requests, a panel
shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first
appears as an item on the DSB's agenda .... ").
219. DSU, supra note 217, arts. 8.5 and 8.7.
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appellate review institution, the Appellate Body, which consists of seven
"judges," to whom the parties to appeal. 2 0 The panel and Appellate Body
reports become binding after the adoption by the Dispute Settlement
Body, comprised of all WTO members, unless the Dispute Settlement
Body determines by consensus not to adopt the reports.22' This "negative
consensus" approach remedies the problem that arose during the GATT
period, where minority parties could "block" the adoption of panel re-
ports. The DSB may authorize the injured Member to request
compensation or, by suspending its concession under relevant agree-
ments, "retaliate" against the losing Member. The Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, which has dealt with 357 cases as of January 2007,23 has
been applauded for its contribution to the multilateral trading system
and, for this reason, the Appellate Body has frequently been referred to
as the "World Trade Court.
'224
a. Separate Customs Territory
To examine whether Taiwan is entitled to access the WTO dispute set-
tlement system, we must trace the ROC's history in the WTO. In 1947, the
ROC, then the only government of China, became one of the 23 contract-
ing parties to the GATT, the predecessor of the WTO.225 In 1950, the ROC
could no longer fulfill GATT obligations undertaken on behalf of the
mainland after losing the civil war. The government thus decided to with-
draw from the GATT.2 6 In 1965, realizing the importance of expanding
foreign market access to Taiwan, the ROC applied for observer status,
220. DSU, supra note 217, art. 17.1. For information on current Appellate Body Mem-
bers, see Dispute Settlement: Members, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/
abmembersdescrpe.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
221. DSU, supra note 217, arts. 16.4 and 17.14.
222. DSU, supra note 217, art. 22.
223. Dispute Settlement: Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu_
status e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
224. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade
Court": Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 605, 605 (2002); see also Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Cen-
terpiece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System,
MATTSTRICHT FACULTY OF LAW WORKING PAPERS 2005-1, at 2 ("The Appellate Body is now,
in all but name, the World Trade Court.").
225. Twenty-three original contracting members include Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Burma, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France,
India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa,
South Rhodesia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yang Guohua & Cheng
Fin, The Process of China's Accession to the WTO, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 297, 297 n.2 (2001).
226. Communication from Secretary-General of the United Nations Regarding China,
GATT/CP/54 (Mar. 6, 1950), available at http://gatt.stanford.edu/search/advanced.
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which was granted.2 7 However, in 1971, given the ROC's loss of its UN
seat, the GATT decided to expel Taiwan. 228
In 1990, Taiwan attempted to rejoin the GATT because of its new
pragmatic policy, which sought wider participation in international or-
ganizations despite the PRC's presence. Taiwan based its application on
Article XXXIII of the GATT under the name of "The Customs Territory
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," abbreviated as "Chinese
Taipei. 229 In Taiwan's view, this name, albeit tedious, decreases sover-
eign disputes and reflects the ROC's jurisdiction over Taiwan and other
outlying islands.23°
The PRC fiercely opposed the ROC's application because of its fear
that Taiwan's membership would strengthen its independent image by
showing that Taiwan and China are of equal legal status.23' The PRC con-
tended that Taiwan's application was illegal because, as part of China,
Taiwan's membership, like that of Hong Kong, must be premised on Bei-
jing's confirmation."232 The PRC's position is untenable for several
reasons. First, the GATT membership requirement is based on "govern-
ments," rather than "states." Article XXXII: 1 clearly stipulates that "[t]he
contracting parties ... shall be understood to be those governments." To
date, although the ROC's status as a State is controversial, the ROC as
the government of Taiwan is rarely challenged. This is why foreign gov-
ernments and courts deemed the ROC to be an independent subject of
international law.
Furthermore, the PRC ignored the distinction between two accession
provisions of the GATT, Article XXVI:5, on which Hong Kong's mem-
bership application was based, and Article XXXIII, on which Taiwan
227. Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L.
25, 26 (1987).
228. Summary Record of the Second Meeting, GATT SR. 27/2 (Nov. 19, 1971).
229. See World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on Entry
of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Sept. 18, 2001)
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres01le/pr244_e.htm.
230. Cf Edwin Hsiao, New Strategy Could Prove Good WHO Medicine, TAIWAN J., Apr.
17, 2008, http://taiwanjoumal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?CtNode=122&xltem=36457 (reporting presi-
dent-elect Ma's "displeasure with the government's plan to apply for WHO membership using
the name Taiwan.").
231. See Note, Susanna Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GAT." A New Urgency with
the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275, 285 (1994)
("[A]cceptance of the ROC's application will promote international recognition of the ROC as
the legitimate government of China" and that "reunification between Taiwan and China would
become even more remote if the GAIT recognizes the strength of Taiwan's economy.");
CHARLES WOLF, FAULT LINES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC TERRAIN 160 (2003) (stating that the
PRC believed Taiwan's WTO membership "as a customs entity[] may enhance [its] defacto
stature as an independent state").
232. Lei Wang, Separate Customs Territory in GATF and Taiwan's Request for GATT
membership, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 17, 19 (1991).
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relied. According to Article XXVI:5, Hong Kong's accession to the
GATT in 1986 was due to the UK's "sponsorship" because Hong Kong
was a British territory, for which the UK possessed "international re-
sponsibility. 233 The PRC, prior to the takeover in 1997, also ensured that
Hong Kong would continue to have "full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations" and other GATT-related matters, thus
maintaining Hong Kong's status as required by Article XXVI:5(c) of the
GATT.1 4 However, the ROC's situation is inherently distinguishable
from that of Hong Kong in both fact and law. Taiwan has never been un-
der the de facto rule of the government of the PRC and, unlike Hong
Kong, is not a colony. Pursuant to Article XXXIII of the GATT, the ROC
is the government that applied for membership "acting on behalf of' its
territories and possesses "full autonomy" in foreign trade relations. 35
Consequently, the ROC is entitled to GATT membership on its own be-
half without the PRC's sponsorship.
It is noteworthy that the 1992 GATT Council specifically expounded
that in examining the accession process of China and Taiwan, "the work-
ing party reports should be examined independently."236 After the
establishment of the WTO in 1994, Taiwan changed its application based
231
on both XXIII of the GAT and Article XII of the WTO Agreement .
On January 1, 2002, Taiwan finally joined the WTO as a "separate cus-
toms territory," a new identity for Taiwan in international law. Similar to
the concept of a "fishing entity" in multilateral fishery agreements, Tai-
wan's accession to the WTO indicates its independent status.
b. Participation in WTO Litigation
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is recognized as "a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trad-
ing system. ' This section analyzes whether Taiwan, as a separate
233. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXVI:5(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]("Each government accepting this Agreement does so
in respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for which it has international
responsibility .... ").
234. See Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 25, 43 (1987) (According to the UK-PRC Agreement, the PRC promised that "the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may par-
ticipate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements .......); see
also, GATT, supra note 233, art. XXVI:5(c).
235. GATT, supra note 233, art. XXXIII.
236. ANALYTICAL INDEX, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 944 (6th ed. 1994) (em-
phasis added).
237. See GATT, supra note 233, art. XXXIII; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XII (stating that "any State or separate
customs territory... may accede to this Agreement.")
238. DSU, supra note 217, art. 3.2.
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customs territory, has the same access to the judicial system as other
States, and whether Taiwan can solve its trade disputes with China at the
WTO. As a starting point, it is important to understand that the WTO
considers "States" and "separate customs territories" to be equal "Mem-
bers," and, hence, Taiwan is entitled to full access to the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism. The WTO has proven to be efficient in dealing
with Taiwan's trade conflicts, as many of them were unable to be re-
solved bilaterally because of a lack of diplomatic ties. 9 Since the US-
Steel Safeguards case, Taiwan's first complaint against US safety meas-
ures on steel products in 2002, the country has participated as a "third
party" in 29 cases as of February 2007.24 Although Taiwan has not yet
been a "real party" to disputes, as other new Members have, the coun-
try's third party experiences have helped to familiarize it with WTO
legal proceedings. Taiwan has appeared before the panels in 16 cases,2 4'
and before the Appellate Body in 10 cases, of which the Appellate Body
examined Taiwan's submissions in three cases.2 2 Because Taiwan is able
to contribute its own legal interpretation, its utilization of the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism is beneficial to the trading system as a whole.
Other Members also benefit because they can now appeal to the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism to request Taiwan's removal of WTO-
inconsistent measures, rather than simply exercising political pressure as
in the past.243
239. For instance, in 1999, Argentina and Poland imposed import restrictions on certain
textile products from Taiwan. Followed by Taiwan's accession to the WTO, the government
requested that Argentina and Poland comply with WTO non-discriminatory obligations. Sub-
sequently, both countries notified Taiwan of the termination of restriction measures by 2002.
Major Responsibilities, Permanent Mission of Taiwan to the WTO, available at
http://www.taiwanwto.ch/about_mission/achievements.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
240. In US-Steel Safeguards (DS274), Taiwan requested consultations with the United
States but did not join the other 8 Members as complaining parties in panel and Appellate
Body proceedings. Taiwan participated as a third party in that case. See Member Information:
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countries-e/chinesetaipeie.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2007); see also DSU, supra note 217, art. 10.2 ("Any Member having a substantial
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in
this Understanding as a 'third party') shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to
make written submissions to the panel.").
241. See Parties and Third Parties in WTO Panel Proceedings, http://worldtradelaw.net
(last visited November 26, 2007).
242. Appellate Body Annual Report for 2006, WT/AB/7 (Jan. 23, 2007), at 34-36. The
three cases include US-Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, US-Countervailing Duty Investigation
on DRAMS, WT/DS296/AB/R, and US-Zeroing (EC), WT/DS294/AB/R. In the other seven
cases before the Appellate Body, Taiwan participated in the oral hearing without submitting
written submissions pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
243. For example, in January 2007, the Dutch electronic company, Phillips, requested
that the European Commission sue Taiwan under the WTO because of Taiwan's compulsory
licensing of Phillips CD-Rom patents, which allegedly constituted a violation under the
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The application of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to
China-Taiwan trade disputes has drawn the world's attention. China
claimed that cross-strait disputes are solely internal affairs and, accord-
ing to its one China principle, such disputes should be resolved
bilaterally and not within the WTO.2'" China erred because its one China
principle cannot override the WTO's compulsory jurisdiction under
which both China and Taiwan are on equal footing. In fact, recent cross-
strait trade disputes have shown that China has realized that failure to
interact with Taiwan would place China in violation of WTO rules.
In May 2005, without notifying the Taiwanese government as re-
quired by Article 12 of the Safeguard Agreement, China imposed
provisional safeguard measures against steel products imported from
Taiwan. 24 Hence, Taiwan's WTO Mission formally requested consulta-
tions with the PRC. China's WTO Mission replied to Taiwan by letter,
but addressed Taiwan's Mission as the "economic trade office," the title
that Hong Kong and Macau use, rather than Taiwan's official title "Per-
manent Representative Mission," which China considers to have
sovereign implications.246 Taiwan immediately responded, referring to
China's slight as "inappropriate" and again requested consultations pur-
suant to WTO rules. 247 Afraid that Taiwan would bring the case to the
WTO and further enhance the "two States" impression, China finally
held a meeting with Taiwan at the latter's Mission on November 12,
2002.248 Although no concrete results were reached in this first-ever
cross-strait meeting under the WTO framework, it paved the way for the
two sides to resolve disputes and bypass their political deadlock.
The cross-strait trade conflicts do not stop here. The steel dispute
was soon followed by the "towel war." In May 2006, Taiwan's local
towel manufacturers applied for import relief contending that cheap
Chinese-made towels were flooding the market in Taiwan, causing a
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS]. If the European
Commission takes the case, Taiwan will face its first legal challenge under the WTO. Kathrin
Hille, Philips Seeks WTO help in Taiwan Dispute (Jan. 15, 2007), FINANCIAL TIMES, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7ec05692-a447-I ldb-bec4-0000779e2340,_i-rssPage=fce0dcea-
3017-11 da-ba9f-00000e251 I c8.html.
244. China Says WTO No Place for Solving Trade Disputes, TAIPEI TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001,
at AI.
245. Only a private steel association in Taiwan was informed. See Agreement on Safe-
guards, art. 12.3 ("A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide
adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial interest
as exporters of the product concerned... ).
246. C.H. Lu & P.C. Tang, Effect of WTO Talks on Cross-Strait Relations Still an Open
Question, CENTRAL NEws AGENCY (TAIWAN), Dec. 16, 2002.
247. Id.
248. See id. Prior to the meeting, two sides reached an implicit agreement that China
would not address the Taiwan Mission as "economic and trade office" or "Taipei, China."
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substantial decline in sales of locally made towels.249 The government
initiated both anti-dumping and safeguard investigations. To meet the
WTO notification requirements, Taiwan's WTO Mission again requested
consultations with its Chinese counterpart. At their meeting, Chinese
representatives expressed that, although China could accept anti-
dumping measures, they found Taiwan's safeguard measures discrimina-
tory. 250 This time, cross-strait interactions went even beyond the
meetings. To assist Chinese towel industries, four PRC officials from the
Ministry of Commerce made a groundbreaking visit, attending a public
hearing held in Taipei as consultants.2 ' An ROC official from the Minis-
try of Finance also traveled to China to investigate the normal value of
Chinese products.2 2
In my view, one of the greatest contributions of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is to make such direct talks, as well as "official"
visits, across the Taiwan Strait possible. Geneva is now the focal point
for bridging the gap between Beijing and Taipei. The WTO provides a
rules-based forum for both China and Taiwan, thereby reducing cross-
strait political tensions. The WTO experience demonstrates that bringing
Taiwan into international tribunals enhances not only global justice but
also China-Taiwan relations.
B. Reasons for Accessing International Courts
The new trend of multilateral agreements and international courts is
to relax the rigid "State" requirements so that they are able to accommo-
date Taiwan, which possesses full autonomy both domestically and
internationally. Taiwan's identity as a fishing entity or a separate customs
territory allows Taiwan to avoid the obstacle of recognition and utilize
international tribunals to resolve disputes. Furthermore, it buttresses
Taiwan's claim of being a subject of international law independent of the
PRC. International tribunals' extension of jurisdiction to Taiwan mirrors,
249. See Taipei, Beijing Officials Tackle Towel Tussle at WTO, TAIPEI TIMES, June. 24,
2006, at A 1l; see also S.C. Chang, Committee Rules China's Towel Dumping Hurts Taiwan
Businesses, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (TAIWAN), Aug. 29, 2006 ("By 2005, Chinese imports
had taken a 70 percent share of Taiwan's towel market, causing 'evident and adverse impact'
on the domestic towel industry."); Susan Yu, ITC Concludes Towel Business Should Get Re-
lief (Mar. 24, 2006) http://www.taiwan.com.au/Polieco/Industry/20060327.html.
250. Taipei, Beijing Officials Tackle Towel Tussle at WTO, supra note 249.
251. David Lague, Taiwan Takes on China in WTO, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/04/business/wto.php.
252. Sofia Wu, Taiwan Official Visits China for Anti-Dumping Probes, CENTRAL NEWS
AGENCY (TAIWAN), June 14, 2006. Finding that the sales of Chinese towels were below mar-
ket value, Taiwan's Ministry of Finance announced on September 19, 2006 that it would
impose a provisional 204.1% anti-dumping tax on imported Chinese towels. Deborah Kuo,
Taiwan Imposing 204 Percent Anti-Dumping Tax on Chinese Towels, CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY
(TAIWAN), Sept. 19, 2006.
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to some extent, the approach of many domestic courts, which deems
Taiwan to be a State for statutory purposes. It is both pragmatic and nec-
essary for international courts to grant standing to Taiwan for three
reasons.
First, the denial of standing before international courts will inevita-
bly shield Taiwan from shouldering its own State responsibility. It is
neither justified nor reasonable to hold the PRC liable for wrongs com-
mitted by Taiwan. Under international law, a State bears responsibility if
it engages in wrongful international acts in violation of its international
obligations."' According to the ICJ in FR.G. v. Poland (the Chorzow
Factory case), a breach of such obligations, in turn, "involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation. 254 If an international tribunal upheld the PRC
version of the "one China" principle, the PRC would be obliged to make
reparation for Taiwan's wrongful acts. Additionally, enforcing judgments
for wrongs committed by Taiwan would be problematic because China
does not have control over Taiwan.
Domestic courts have perceived this problem, which is why the Ca-
nadian court in Romania v. Cheng rejected the PRC's request for
jurisdiction and transferred suspected crews to Taiwan, the flag State
responsible for adjudicating the case. WTO rules further show that,
should measures adopted by Taiwan be inconsistent with WTO rules, it
is Taiwan, not China, that should bring the measures into conformity or
suffer trade retaliation. These examples should inform international tri-
bunals; if Taiwan is granted standing before the courts, the injured States
can directly ask Taiwan to bear State responsibility, thereby promptly
resolving disputes.
Second, denying Taiwan access to international courts will deprive
its 23 million nationals of their individual human rights. It is frequently
argued that, by granting individual access to certain international courts
and tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights or treaty-
based human rights committees,255 international law has gradually de-
parted from the embedded Westphalian concept of sovereign States.
Nonetheless, the very premise of the State requirement, which most in-
ternational courts require, has not yet eroded. If a national's human
rights are infringed upon by another State, a remedy can be found if their
253. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001).
254. The Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 24 (Sept.
13).
255. For example, committees established under Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention for the Elimination of
All Form of Racial Discrimination may receive complaints from individuals whose states are
parties to those treaties.
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governments exercise diplomatic protection and seek international re-
dress for them.256 A dire situation could arise concerning ROC citizens if
the country is denied standing before international courts. ROC nationals
will be deprived of the opportunity to assert their rights, and infractions
on these rights will go unpunished.
The PRC may assert that it is entitled to exercise protection on be-
half its "nationals" on Taiwan. This position ignores the holding of the
Nottebohm case. In that case, Frederic Nottebohm was a German na-
tional who lived in Guatemala for 34 years and later became a
naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. Nottebohm's connection with Liech-
tenstein was tenuous. In fact, he had only paid the country a few brief
visits. When he returned to Guatemala in 1940 under his Liechtenstein
passport, Nottebohm was deemed to be an enemy alien since Guatemala
had sided with the Allies during World War II. As a result, the Guatema-
lan government deported him and expropriated his property. After the
war, Liechtenstein brought the case against Guatemala to the ICJ, seek-
ing damages. The ICJ agreed with Guatemala's argument, finding that
despite Nottebohm's Liechtenstein citizenship, he was not a national of
Liechtenstein under international law, given the lack of "genuine connec-
tion" with that country.257 The ICJ dismissed the case. In my view, the
PRC's desire to exercise protection of nationals of Taiwan can hardly
overcome the "genuine connection" threshold. The relationship between
the PRC and people in Taiwan is even more remote than the relationship
between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm, as most Taiwanese people have
never set foot in mainland China and do not possess PRC citizenship.
Therefore, by denying Taiwan's standing, international tribunals would
render 23 million ROC citizens "stateless" and divest them of their hu-
man rights, which are presumably "universal. 258
256. See The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railways Case (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 76, at 13 (Feb. 28) ("[I]n the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality
between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplo-
matic protection .... ").
257. The ICJ defined nationality as "a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of at-
tachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties." Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. (Apr.
6). See also David L. Nersessian, The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups
Under the Genocide Convention, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293, 301-02 (2003) (detailing the
Nottebohm case and discussing criticism regarding the ICJ's rulings).
258. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (Art. 1 provides that "[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," while Article 2 states that "[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any




Finally, the world as a whole would suffer social and economic costs
if international tribunals are unable to resolve disputes concerning Tai-
wan. As a significant trading nation, Taiwan has concluded numerous
bilateral agreements, such as double taxation and investment treaties.
Similar agreements concluded between other States usually designate an
international tribunal, such as the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, or the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
under the World Bank, to adjudicate disputes arising from those agree-
ments. Given Taiwan's inability to access international courts,.
contracting parties are precluded from resorting to rule-based judicial
forums and can only rely on uncertain political bargains in disputes with
Taiwan. This prolongs the process and incurs higher economic costs.
This situation undermines the foundation and the goals of the interna-
tional courts, which are to promote predictability and prompt settlement
of global disputes in a peaceful way.
The WTO's dispute settlement system, to which Taiwan has access,
provides a prime example of why Taiwan should be incorporated into the
international judicial system. The world has witnessed the WTO's suc-
cess in facilitating the resolution of trade conflicts between Taiwan and
the rest of the world in a cost efficient way. The fact that China and Tai-
wan can now resolve their quarrels through the WTO's rule-based
system further vindicates this view. I believe that the WTO experience
should inform the global community and international courts. A simpler
question is, if international courts are incapable of resolving conflicts
involving Taiwan, can such courts still be called "international?"
CONCLUSION
Since its loss of the China seat in the United Nations, the Republic
of China on Taiwan has become the most renowned example of an "un-
recognized State" under international law. This Article has argued that
despite this unrecognized status, the ROC should be considered a State
for statutory purposes in judicial proceedings in foreign and international
courts. Moreover, this Article finds that China has been a "divided State"
since the establishment of the PRC on mainland China and the ROC's
relocation to Taiwan. The ROC and the PRC are two equal entities under
international law. The practice of foreign courts vindicates this view by
ruling that Taiwan, which meets the criteria for statehood under the
Montevideo Convention, never lost its State status as a result of derecog-
nition. Whether relying on statutory or common law, courts in diverse
jurisdictions almost uniformly confirm the validity of Taiwan's rights to
treaties and property concluded and acquired prior to derecognition. By
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so doing, foreign courts rejected the PRC's claim that it has "succeeded"
the ROC. The judicial recognition of treating Taiwan as a foreign State
has risen to the level of an "international custom," creating a binding
effect on all tribunals.
The issue of Taiwan's standing before international courts is com-
plex, given the State requirements to access those courts. In the case of
the International Court of Justice, this Article argues that Taiwan may
file a declaration with the ICJ declaring its acceptance of the Court's ju-
risdiction, although Taiwan incurs high political risks for pursuing this
course of action. In certain fields of international law, the global com-
munity has begun to share the views of the domestic courts and has
started to carefully carve out exceptions to accommodate Taiwan. Thus,
Taiwan is now widely recognized as a fishing entity and a separate cus-
toms territory in multilateral fisheries agreements and within the World
Trade Organization, respectively. In turn, Taiwan's new identities form a
legal basis for the nation to access the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea and the WTO dispute settlement system. Although this ar-
rangement reflects a reluctant political compromise between the
international community and the PRC, it avoids the undesirable creation
of a "judicial black hole."
The Taiwan question has stirred intense political debate in the inter-
national arena for many decades. Despite Taiwan's absence of
recognition, the international community has accorded Taiwan status as
an independent entity or territory, thereby accepting Taiwan as a subject
of international law. Although political situations surrounding both Tai-
wan and the world have changed rapidly, the fairness of every judicial
system should remain constant. Consequently, political obstacles should
not preclude the fundamental goal of the courts, which is to pursue jus-
tice. Recognizing that global fairness and justice should be universally
applied without national boundaries, Taiwan should be entitled to its day
in court.
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